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KIDNAPPING RECONSIDERED: COURTS MERGER
TESTS INADEQUATELY REMEDY THE INEQUITIES WHICH




After a late-night party, Percy Wilder, a black man, tried to convince Danielle
Peterson, a white woman, to come outside to his car.1 After some back-and-forth,
Peterson somewhat hesitantly left and Wilder persuaded her to get into the car.2
Wilder then pulled out, Peterson’s legs still hanging out the door.3 As he drove,
Wilder asked for oral sex, but Peterson refused.4 Only a few minutes later, Wilder
pulled into an apartment complex and parked near the dumpster.5 He stopped the car
and asked her to undress.6 He “tried to put his hand up her shirt” then put his head
on her breast and bit her.7 When she still refused, he screamed “get naked” and
threatened to cut her if she tried to get out of the car.8 As Peterson started to remove
her shoes, Wilder said he would “count to three, and if you are not naked, I’m going
to gut you from head to toe.”9
At the count of two, Peterson threw open the door and bolted, making it to the
apartment complex where she pounded on the doors, screaming for help.10 Wilder
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law, Weber State Uni-
versity, BA, 2000; Brigham Young University, JD, 2003; University of Utah, PhD, expected
2020. Thank you to Daniel Medwed, Aliza Cover, and Don Burnett for their thoughtful com-
ments on this Article. I represented Mr. Percy Wilder on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
Percy maintained his innocence and like many criminal appeals, it soon moved beyond that
specific question. I would like to thank him in particular and hope that the courts provide him
a more just result than we achieved on appeal. Percy was sentenced to prison for fifteen years
to life on the kidnapping charge.
1 State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶¶ 4–5, 420 P.3d 1064, 1066.
2 Id. ¶ 5.
3 Id. ¶ 6.
4 Id. ¶ 7.




9 Id. ¶ 10.
10 Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
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caught her and grabbed her by the hair, but Peterson locked her arms and legs,
which kept Wilder from dragging her back.11 He released her, “punched her in the
face, and ran off.”12
Clearly the State could have charged Wilder with sexual assault, yet it also
charged him with and convicted him of kidnapping.13 How did Wilder commit a
kidnapping? At least at first, Peterson willingly got in the car.14 According to the
State, when Wilder grabbed Peterson’s hair, that detention, albeit for only a second
or two, was enough to commit a separate kidnapping offense.15 This was not just a
sexual assault; it was a sexual assault and an extremely brief kidnap. On appeal,
Wilder argued that the kidnapping, if there was one, was not sufficiently independ-
ent of the assault and that any detention that happened was merely incidental to the
sexual assault which was still in progress.16 Wilder then asked the court to merge his
kidnapping conviction with the sexual assault.17
Kidnapping is not the crime most people think it is. When someone mentions
a kidnapping, most think of something like taking a child at a bus stop or holding
a hostage.18 We think of its definition: “to steal (a child), to carry off (a person) by
illegal force.”19 But kidnapping has never really been about that. Kidnapping was
based on rare and sensationalized crimes that led legislatures to impulsively expand
it into such an extremely broad offense that it poses serious constitutional prob-
lems.20 I argue that legislatures and courts must redefine kidnapping and abolish
their common law merger tests, tests that were created to solve a problem that was
entirely of their own making.
In Part I of this Article, I trace kidnapping’s history in both English and Ameri-
can common law.21 Kidnapping did not become an offense when throngs of black
people were taken from their homes and forced into slavery, but rather when cash-
hungry exploiters stole vulnerable white children, particularly those whose parents
11 Id. ¶ 12.
12 Id.
13 See id. ¶ 13.
14 See id. ¶ 5.
15 Brief of Petitioner at 50, State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, 420 P.3d 1064 (No. 20160952-
SC); Brief of Respondent at 44–45, State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, 420 P.3d 1064 (No. 20160952-
SC).
16 See Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶ 16 n.2.
17 See id. ¶ 14.
18 One manual lists seven types of kidnapping that fit these generalizations. See DIANA
M. CONCANNON, KIDNAPPING: AN INVESTIGATOR’S GUIDE 3 (2d ed. 2013).
19 Kidnap, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2019).
20 See Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 540, 540 (1953)
[hereinafter A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping].
21 See infra Part I.
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had means, and sent them to America as indentured servants.22 Only then did
English courts declare their outrage and act to create a common law offense.23
In America, even though black people were regularly kidnapped and sold into
slavery, the offense itself remained mostly dormant given that few white children
were sent across the ocean.24 Black people tenaciously fought their own kidnappings
in the courts, but found little to no sympathy or success because, to quote Frank
Wilderson III, they were “generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous vio-
lence, and void of kinship structure.”25 Most whites simply turned a blind eye to
kidnappings of a whole race of people in their back yard.26
By the late nineteenth century, enterprising criminals started to kidnap the children
of rich white people and hold them hostage.27 These cases generated torrents of
publicity and prompted the public and political officials to demand action, which
usually involved reactionary legislative expansions of kidnapping’s definition or
punishment.28 Conversely, near silence occurred when large numbers of blacks were
taken and even lynched.29 In many of these cases, the perpetrators of violence were
part of the very establishment charged with enforcing kidnapping statutes.30
Over the next several decades, usually after the publicized kidnapping of a white
child, states continued to incrementally broaden the offense.31 But the floodgates
22 See PAULA S. FASS, KIDNAPPED: CHILD ABDUCTION IN AMERICA 10 (1997); CAROL
WILSON, FREEDOM AT RISK: THE KIDNAPPING OF FREE BLACKS IN AMERICA, 1780–1865, at
2, 7 (1994); B.W. Napier, Detention Offences at Common Law, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL
LAW 190, 194 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1978). See generally JOHN WAREING, INDENTURED
MIGRATION AND THE SERVANT TRADE FROM LONDON TO AMERICA, 1618–1718: ‘THERE IS
GREAT WANT OF SERVANTS’ (2016).
23 ABBOT EMERSON SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND CONVICT
LABOR IN AMERICA 1607–1776, at 71 (1947); Barry M. Coldrey, ‘. . . A Place to Which Idle
Vagrants May Be Sent,’ 13 CHILD. & SOC’Y 32, 41 (1999).
24 WILSON, supra note 22, at 2.
25 FRANK B. WILDERSON III, RED, WHITE & BLACK: CINEMA AND THE STRUCTURE OF
U.S. ANTAGONISMS 11 (2010).
26 WILSON, supra note 22, at 7.
27 FASS, supra note 22, at 17.
28  Coldrey, supra note 23, at 41; A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20,
at 540.
29 LYNCHING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS 229 (Christopher Waldrep ed.,
2006) [hereinafter LYNCHING IN AMERICA].
30 Howard Kester, The Marianna, Florida Lynching, in LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra
note 29, at 230–32 (describing how law enforcement permitted a mob to seize a jailed black
man and lynch him).
31 See People v. Knowles, 217 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1950) (following well publicized kidnap-
pings, “the punishment specified by existing statutes defining kidnapping was increased”);
Hugh A. Fisher & Matthew F. McGuire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lindbergh Law, 12
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 646, 653 (1935); A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20, at 540.
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opened with the landmark kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh’s baby in 1932.32 The
case and its extensive publicity sent federal and state governments on an emotionally
charged quest to augment kidnapping’s definition to such an extent that it came to
encompass “a wide and ill-defined range of behavior” and now “elude[s] meaningful
definition.”33
These legislative overreactions came with significant cost.34 Once legislatures
departed from kidnapping’s common law definition—where a person had to be
transported a significant distance or held hostage—to one in which a person could
commit a kidnapping with little to no movement or hostage taking, a new set of
problems appeared.35
Many criminal offenses have a detention inherent in the crime itself.36 Defendants
who commit rapes, murders, or robberies, for example, often, if not always, detain
or forcibly move their victims. They often do not intend to kidnap per se—they
intend to commit other crimes—but because kidnapping was now broadly defined,
the person, whether intentionally or not, had incidentally committed a kidnapping.37
Because kidnapping’s definition was so expansive and now overlapped with almost
any offense involving some sort of detention, it created a host of constitutional
problems. Now prosecutors could, for various unsavory motives such as racial dis-
crimination, stack charges and violate double jeopardy or equal protection.
To remedy these issues, courts began to create tests—kidnapping merger tests—to
decide when a kidnapping offense should merge with the underlying crime.38 In
essence, courts would examine the facts of a particular case to determine if a kid-
napping offense was sufficiently distinct to support a separate conviction. I will
detail these tests and courts’ rationales in creating them.
Next, I critique the tests, which have not fixed these problems. As one commen-
tator put it, courts’ “merger analysis has been, to be charitable, a mess.”39 Courts in
every state have produced a voluminous number of cases that make fine-tooth fac-
tual distinctions among cases, but produce little consistency in the law.40 These tests
32 Horace L. Bomar, Jr., The Lindbergh Law, 1 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 435–36
(1934); A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20, at 540.
33 John L. Diamond, Kidnapping: A Modern Definition, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1 (1985);
A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20, at 540.
34 See Fisher & McGuire, supra note 31, at 648–49, 653, 655–56 (describing the breadth
of legislative changes that followed kidnappings).
35 See id.
36 Melanie A. Prince, Comment, Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with
Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond, 76 TENN. L. REV. 789, 792 (2009).
37 Id. at 790, 792.
38 Diamond, supra note 33, at 15; Prince, supra note 36, at 811.
39 Bruce A. Antkowiak, Picking Up the Pieces of the Gordian Knot: Towards a Sensible
Merger Methodology, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 259, 260 (2007).
40 See generally Diamond, supra note 33; A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra
note 20; Prince, supra note 36 (all describing various state kidnapping statutes and their
inconsistencies).
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do not work. Even though they appear logical, in reality, courts do nothing more than
guess whether something “feels” like a separate kidnapping. The tests are reminiscent
of Justice Potter Stewart’s famous line related to pornographic material, “I know it
when I see it.”41 The tests have produced little to no logical or factual consistency.
Most problematically, courts’ various tests avoid confronting the very real con-
stitutional problems kidnapping’s reactionary and expanded definition has worked
into the law. State and federal agencies gather little to no information on kidnapping
offenses.42 But the definition of kidnapping is so broad and vague that it enables a
prosecutor to continue the well-worn pattern of using kidnapping to treat minorities
differently. The prosecutor need only add a kidnapping charge to another criminal
charge. When defendants have raised constitutional challenges to kidnapping statutes,
the courts have remained sadly silent and have turned a blind eye—like they have
in previous centuries—to these real problems.43 Time and again, courts have largely
refused to give these constitutional provisions any remedial power.44
To this end, in Part II, I propose two simple solutions.45 First, legislatures should
drastically restrict kidnapping’s definition so that it no longer overlaps with so many
other criminal offenses, like has been done with the Model Penal Code.46 The definition
should make the offense unique again, requiring things like transportation a signifi-
cant distance or hostage taking. This is the easiest solution, greatly restricts a prose-
cutor’s ability to discriminate, and would end the need for kidnapping merger tests.
But I acknowledge that state legislatures are not likely to find much political sup-
port to substantially contract a kidnapping statute. Consequently, courts should be
willing to strike down kidnapping statutes for vagueness, and for violating the Double
Jeopardy, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and Equal Protection Clauses. This too,
would spell a welcome end for kidnapping merger tests and would force governmental
agencies to only prosecute kidnappings that fit within a much more normative view.
Defendants should be punished for the crimes they commit. But when legislatures
draft hundreds of criminal statutes, many of which incorporate inherent detentions,
criminal defendants risk serving even more time than they should, as prosecutors
have every incentive to simply add an extra kidnapping offense. We know prosecu-
tors often disparately charge minority defendants47 and we need to gather data to
41 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
42 See DAVID FINKELHOR & RICHARD ORMROD, DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ181161, KIDNAP-
PING OF JUVENILES: PATTERNS FROM NIBRS 2–3, 7 (2000).
43 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584–87 (1958); State v. Jacobs, 380 P.2d 998,
1001–03 (Ariz. 1963); Prince, supra note 36, at 790.
44 See Williams, 358 U.S. at 584–87; Jacobs, 380 P.2d at 1001–03.
45 See infra Part II.
46 Diamond, supra note 33, at 27–28.
47 See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Black People Charged at a Higher Rate than Whites. What
If Prosecutors Didn’t Know Their Race?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html [https://nyti.ms/2MJ3j0k].
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discover the extent of this problem, but if the past is any indication, it is likely an
extensive one.
Because kidnapping has virtually no boundaries, prosecutors can improperly
discriminate and defendants could never prove otherwise. Courts should no longer
avoid the merger problem. Instead, if the legislature will not fix it, then the courts
must force them to redefine kidnapping so that it fits within constitutional norms.
I. KIDNAPPING HAS DISCRIMINATORY ORIGINS
A. Kidnapping at English Common Law
At common law, kidnapping required the defendant to carry a victim out of their
country.48 Kidnapping had roots in the ancient world.49 The Bible contained a pro-
scription.50 Prohibitions against selling slaves and freemen appeared in Anglo-Saxon
law from as early as the seventh century through the eleventh century in Kentish
law, King Ine’s dooms, Cnut’s laws, and the Law of Æthelberht.51 The Magna Carta
prohibited imprisoning freemen without cause.52
Kidnapping became a part of the common law as a white person’s offense—
usually when a child was taken to serve in the Navy or to populate the colonies—since
English common law did little to prevent the forcible kidnapping of millions of
Africans and black slaves.53
48 State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550, 566 (1837); State v. Harrison, 59 S.E. 867, 870 (N.C. 1907);
Click v. State, 3 Tex. 282, 282 (1848) (reversed on other grounds); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *219; Diamond, supra note 33, at 2; Fisher &
McGuire, supra note 31, at 648 (“As a common law crime, it would seem the crime was looked
upon as an aggravated species of false imprisonment so that, in addition to the essential element
of false imprisonment, another element was necessary, namely, that of sending away the
person against whom the offense was committed from his own country to another.”); Prince,
supra note 36, at 789.
49 Bruce D. Bickel, Note, Struggling with California’s Kidnapping to Commit Robbery
Provision, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1336 (1975).
50 Exodus 21:16 (“And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his
hand, he shall surely be put to death.”).
51 LAW COMMISSION, SIMPLIFICATION OF CRIMINAL LAW: KIDNAPPING, CONSULTATION
PAPER NO. 200, ¶ 2.6 (2011); 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 12 (Boston, Little, Brown
& Co. 1895).
52 No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any
way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so,
except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.
Magna Carta, BRIT. LIB. (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta
-english-translation [https://perma.cc/R364-7B2U]; see also Napier, supra note 22, at 191.
53 ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 117–18
(1982); ADAM ROTHMAN, BEYOND FREEDOM’S REACH: A KIDNAPPING IN THE TWILIGHT OF
SLAVERY 8–9 (2015); Markus Vink, “The World’s Oldest Trade”: Dutch Slavery and Slave
2020] KIDNAPPING RECONSIDERED 641
In 1622, the Deputy of the Virginia Company warned its stockholders of a
troubling trend: “divers old Planters and others did allure and beguile divers young
persons and others . . . to serve them upon intollerable and unchristianlike condicons
upon promises of such rewards and recompence, as they were no wayes able to
performe nor ever meant.”54 The newly bustling Atlantic trade proved too great a
temptation: unscrupulous sorts would grab children or tempt them with sweets, induce
vagrants with alcohol, or others with elaborate promises, and sell them to captains,
who would pay a pound or two per person and ask little to no questions.55
In 1645 Parliament tried to step in, passing legislation to curb kidnapping, or
“spiriting” as it was called, and creating a servant registry, which compelled searches
of vessels for children and required officers and ministers of justice to apprehend
people who were stealing, selling, buying, conveying, or receiving “[c]hildren so
stolne” and to imprison them.56
But the problem continued.57 Legal recourse was difficult and redress required
the intervention of some high authority, which meant parties usually had to have the
means to petition the king, the Privy Council, the Lord Mayor, or the Court of
Aldermen of London for relief.58 For example, in 1653, Robert Broome was able to
Trade in the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century, 14 J. WORLD HIST. 131, 132 (2003);
see also POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 51, at 12; WILSON, supra note 22, at 2–5. The
African slave trade repeatedly involved forcible and involuntary kidnapping. However, this
appears to have had little influence on the development of a common law kidnapping offense,
as outrage seemed to relate to the forcible asportation of white children. See generally SHARON
V. SALINGER, “TO SERVE WELL AND FAITHFULLY”: LABOR AND INDENTURED SERVANTS IN
PENNSYLVANIA, 1682–1800 (1987); WAREING, supra note 22; Emily Blanck, Seventeen
Eighty-Three: The Turning Point in the Law of Slavery and Freedom in Massachusetts, 75
NEW ENG. Q. 24 (2002); Mildred Campbell, Social Origins of Some Early Americans, in
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 63 (James Smith ed.,
1959); Coldrey, supra note 23; Audra A. Diptee, African Children in the British Slave Trade
During the Late Eighteenth Century, 27 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 183 (2006); Russell R.
Menard, British Migration to the Chesapeake Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, in COLO-
NIAL CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY 99 (Lois Green Carr et al. eds., 1988).
54 SMITH, supra note 23, at 67–68. Sir Josiah Child wrote in 1694 that Virginia and
Barbados were colonized in part with people who “Merchants and Masters of Ships, by their
Agents, or Spirits, as they were called, gathered up about the streets of London, and other Places,
clothed and transported, to be employed upon Plantations.” SIR JOSIAH CHILD, A NEW DIS-
COURSE OF TRADE 197 (London, 4th ed. 1745); see also JACK P. GREENE, EVALUATING EMPIRE
AND CONFRONTING COLONIALISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 53–54 (2013).
55 FASS, supra note 22, at 11; SMITH, supra note 23, at 68; WILSON, supra note 22, at 4.
Coldrey, supra note 23, at 40–42; David Souden, ‘Rogues, Whores and Vagabonds’? Indentured
Servant Emigrants to North America, and the Case of Mid-Seventeenth-Century Bristol, 3
SOC. HIST. 23, 24 (1978) (“People of every age and kind were decoyed, seduced, inveigled,
or forcibly kidnapped and carried as servants to the plantations.”). Often children and other
captives were held for weeks in squalid depots of captives. SMITH, supra note 23, at 69–70.
56 SMITH, supra note 23, at 71; Coldrey, supra note 23, at 43.
57 Coldrey, supra note 23, at 43.
58 SMITH, supra note 23, at 71–73; Coldrey, supra note 23, at 43.
642 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:635
get his eleven-year-old son back by securing a warrant for the ship’s master.59 In 1657,
a search of the ship Conquer, bound for the West Indies, uncovered nineteen servants,
eleven of whom “had been ‘taken by the spirits,’” and were removed from the ship.60
These efforts did not always go well.61 The Privy Council soundly rebuked a clerk
in 1663 for releasing kidnapped servants from the ship Reserve bound for Maryland.62
And while in the years that followed, Parliament created a registry where ports had
to note servants’ age, birth location, and residence, the record books did little good,
especially since many people were smuggled and it was difficult for emigrant agents
to accurately know a person’s status.63 To fix this problem, in 1682 Parliament re-
quired servants to appear before a magistrate who would witness the indenture.64 But
even this measure was insufficient.65
The first appearance of kidnapping as a separate common law offense appears
to have occurred in May 1682, when John Wilmore, a London merchant, was charged
by information directly from the King’s Bench “for spiriting or kidnapping away a
young boy under the age of 13 years, called Richard Sivitor, and sending him to
Jamaica” with a ship captain named Jones.66 Witnesses insisted there was a child
kidnapping trade and that some five hundred children alone had been kidnapped and
sent away.67 When Sivitor’s parents tried to get the boy back, Wilmore apparently
said he would do it if they paid for his return passage.68
Wilmore’s defense focused on the fact “that the child was very willing to go
with him,” that the boy cried when asked about going home, and that Wilmore had
“done a very good act of charity, having bound [the boy] to a carpenter [in Jamaica],
and so provided for him better than the parents could.”69
59 SMITH, supra note 23, at 71–72.
60 Id. at 72.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 73; Coldrey, supra note 23, at 43; Souden, supra note 55, at 26.
64 SMITH, supra note 23, at 78.
65 Id. at 79; James Horn, Servant Emmigration to the Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Cen-
tury, in THE CHESAPEAKE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: ESSAYS ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIETY
51, 55 n.17 (Thad W. Tate & David Ammerman eds., 1979).
66 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
PRESENT TIME 1347–49 (London, R. Bagshaw 1810) [hereinafter COBBETT’S COMPLETE COL-
LECTION]; see also LAW COMMISSION, supra note 51, ¶ 2.6; SMITH, supra note 23, at 74–75
(spelling the boy’s name “Civiter”). Wilmore allegedly committed the kidnapping in 1679–80.
After Wilmore served on a grand jury in 1680 that defied Charles II and indicted the Duke of
York and in 1681 refused to indict Stephen College, Wilmore found himself charged with high
treason and imprisoned for fifteen weeks in the Tower of London until he paid the £9000
bail. SMITH, supra note 23, at 75.
67 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION, supra note 66, at 1349.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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Lord Chief Justice Pemberton was outraged.70 He disparaged “the horrid practice
of kidnapping children, and left the matter very plain to the jury” such that the jury,
without ever leaving the courtroom, rendered a guilty verdict, for which Pemberton
openly praised them.71 Pemberton had led a “savage campaign against kidnappers,” by
October that same year, in part because the “abuse was rampant,” and several other
people—mostly “faithful and indispensable adjuncts” among the country’s “most re-
spected merchants”—had been prosecuted, fined and committed.72 By January 1683,
Richard Sivitor was returned home.73 At the same time, the court also found a viola-
tion for “secreting another,” when Lord Grey seduced a daughter of Lord Berkley
and detained her in secret in his house.74
But even Pemberton’s judicial campaign did not stop people from kidnapping
indentures, which were difficult to detect and to enforce and was a greatly overstated
problem, at least as to white children.75 Black or Native slaves were forcibly taken
by the millions, both to and from America, with no reaction in the common law
courts.76 Between 1675 and 1700 alone, British ships took over 272,000 slaves,
70 Id.
71 Id. Wilmore was to be taken as security to ensure the child’s return, but he hid and suc-
cessfully fled to Holland. SMITH, supra note 23, at 76.
72 See Designy’s Case (1683) 83 Eng. Rep. 247, 247–48; 2 Show. 221 (Designy was a mer-
chant who took a boy from the Merchant-Taylors School to Jamaica and was imprisoned until
he could pay the fine); R v. Baily (1724) 90 Eng. Rep. 312, 312; Comb 10; The King & Wilmore
(1682) 90 Eng. Rep. 23, 23; Skin 47; COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION, supra note 66, at
1349; SMITH, supra note 23, at 74–77 (“Kidnapping nevertheless continued. Cases in the
Middlesex court were as frequent as ever, and the series of petitions for individual redress kept
on growing.”); Napier, supra note 22, at 195; see also R v. Swimmer (1753) 96 Eng. Rep.
818, 898; Say. 103. In Swimmer, the defendant, a parish officer “had bound [and sent] three
poor children to serve as apprentices in foreign parts.” 96 Eng. Rep. at 898. The court was
inclined to “make the rule absolute; the offence being deemed kidnapping,” but discharged
the case on the defendant’s promise “to have the children back by a certain time.” Id. It
appears most prosecutions were related to three types of kidnapping: shady relatives who
conspired to send youthful heirs away, commercial kidnapping rackets, or taking another’s
servant and selling him or her. Coldrey, supra note 23, at 42.
73 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION, supra note 66, at 1350.
74 The King against Lord Grey (1683) 89 Eng. Rep. 900, 900; 2 Show. 218; LAW COM-
MISSION, supra note 51, ¶ 2.7.
75 SMITH, supra note 23, at 79–84; Souden, supra note 55, at 38 (“[Y]oung emigrants . . .
were fundamentally part of the general degree of extra-local mobility within pre-industrial
England: they were not the rogues, the whores and the vagabonds that the prevailing mythology
might still lead us to believe.”).
76 WENDY WARREN, NEW ENGLAND BOUND: SLAVERY AND COLONIZATION IN EARLY
AMERICA 91–92 (2016) (noting that the sale of a Native American man was ordered by the
local justice system); PETER H. WOOD, STRANGE NEW LAND: AFRICANS IN COLONIAL
AMERICA 36 (2003) (“All told, well over twelve million people endured this brutal traffic to
the New World, and several million more perished during the so-called Middle Passage.”).
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making that trade “the linchpin of English overseas activity.”77 The outrage over the
relatively few involuntary white indentures paled in comparison to the non-reaction
to black slaves.78 Pemberton and others must not have thought that the two types of
kidnapping were equal. As the Barbados assembly stated in 1661, it denounced child
indentured kidnappings but clarified its condemnation applied only to “Children of
the English Nation.”79
Kidnapping had now entered the common law.80 In 1755, Johnson’s Dictionary de-
fined kidnap as “to steal children; to steal human beings” and Blackstone defined it as
“the forcible abduction or stealing away of man, woman, or child from their own
country, and selling them into another.”81 Because courts mostly restricted kidnapping
to the forcible taking of white children overseas, it would “enter[ ] a long period of
legal oblivion.”82
B. Across the Pond: Kidnapping at American Common Law
Across the Atlantic, in American common law, the most highly publicized kid-
nappings involved white people who claimed to have been taken captives by natives.83
One notable account came from Peter Williamson, who insisted he was kidnapped
in Britain, sold on the indenture market in America, and was eventually abducted
by Indians in 1754.84 They were a kind of “sophisticated, romanticized mythology,”
77 L.H. ROPER, ADVANCING EMPIRE: ENGLISH INTERESTS AND OVERSEAS EXPANSION,
1613–1688, at 220 (2017).
78 See, e.g., id. (describing the volume at the slave trade).
79 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO, 1550–1812, at 86 (2d ed. 2012).
80 In 1803, Sir Edward East, citing Lord Grey’s case, fully recognized kidnapping as a
separate offense as a form of false imprisonment. “The most aggravated species of false
imprisonment is the stealing and carrying away, or secreting of any person, sometimes called
kidnapping, which is an offence at common law, punishable by fine, imprisonment, and pil-
lory.” 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429–30 (London, A.
Strahon 1803). East cited examples of people who were taken out of their counties and often
held for “great ransoms,” observing that the offenses usually required transportation out of
the county, to foreign countries, or imprisoning people against their will, making no mention
of black slavery. Id. at 430–32.
81 BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *219; 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1150 (Arno Press 1979) (1755) (“These people lye in wait for our chil-
dren, and may be considered as a kind of kidnappers within the law.” (quoting the Spectator)).
82 Cf. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 51, ¶ 2.7 (noting the definition at kidnapping
remained based on three legal cases involving white children); Napier, supra note 22, at 195.
83 See FASS, supra note 22, at 14.
84 TIMOTHY J. SHANNON, INDIAN CAPTIVE, INDIAN KING: PETER WILLIAMSON IN AMERICA
AND BRITAIN 13–14 (2018); PETER WILLIAMSON, FRENCH AND INDIAN CRUELTY: EXEMPLIFIED
IN THE LIFE AND VARIOUS VICISSITUDES OF FORTUNE, OF PETER WILLIAMSON A DISBANDED
SOLDIER 3, 5–7, 11, 13 (York, J. Jackson 2d ed. 1758).
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as the historian Richard Slotkin has said, based on accounts like Williamson’s or
Mary Rowlandson’s and more than seven hundred to follow.85 The narratives were
massively successful.86 James Riley’s account of his capture by North African
“wandering Arabs” went through at least twenty-eight editions and sold over a mil-
lion copies.87 John Williams’s Redeemed Captive, Returning to Zion (1707) sold
over one hundred thousand copies through its twentieth edition in 1918.88
These accounts depicted people taken from white civilization to a “black wilder-
ness” and served to establish white-Euro identity, social hierarchies, and “Anglo-
Christian self-righteousness” at a time where Euro-Americans struggled with their place
in a new and foreign land.89 The narratives “define[d] non-Western peoples as by nature
85 Kathryn Zabelle Derounian, The Publication, Promotion, and Distribution of Mary
Rowlandson’s Indian Captivity Narrative in the Seventeenth Century, 23 EARLY AM. LITERA-
TURE 239, 239 (1988); David T. Haberly, Women and Indians: The Last of the Mohicans and
the Captivity Tradition, 28 AM. Q. 431, 431 (1976); Nabil Matar, Introduction to DANIEL J.
VITKUS, PIRACY, SLAVERY, AND REDEMPTION: BARBARY CAPTIVITY NARRATIVES FROM EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 1, 37 (2001); RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE:
THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1600–1860, at 25 (1974); Tiffany Potter,
Writing Indigenous Femininity: Mary Rowlandson’s Narrative of Captivity, 36 EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY STUD. 153–54 (2003) (noting that Rowlandson saw “herself as superior to any
woman of difference” and “the naturalness of Puritan cultural dominance in the New World”);
Michael Sturma, Aliens and Indians: A Comparison of Abduction and Captivity Narratives,
36 J. POPULAR CULTURE 318, 318 (2002); see FASS, supra note 22, at 14.
86 Haberly, supra note 85, at 431.
87 See generally JAMES RILEY, AN AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE OF THE LOSS OF THE
AMERICAN BRIG COMMERCE, WRECKED ON THE WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA, IN THE MONTH
OF AUGUST, 1815, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE SUFFERINGS OF THE SURVIVING OFFICERS AND
CREW, WHO WERE ENSLAVED BY THE WANDERING ARABS, ON THE AFRICAN DESART, OR
ZAHAHRAH; AND OBSERVATIONS HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, & C. MADE DURING THE
TRAVELS OF THE AUTHOR, WHILE A SLAVE TO THE ARABS, AND IN THE EMPIRE OF MOROCCO
(Hartford, S. Andras & Son 1846); Paul Baepler, The Barbary Captivity Narrative in American
Culture, 39 EARLY AM. LITERATURE 217, 217 (2004).
88 JUNE NAMIAS, WHITE CAPTIVES: GENDER AND ETHNICITY ON THE AMERICAN FRON-
TIER 9 (1993).
89 PAUL BAEPLER, WHITE SLAVES, AFRICAN MASTERS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
BARBARY CAPTIVITY NARRATIVES 13 (1999); Matar, supra note 85, at 37; see Robert J. Denn,
Captivity Narratives of the American Revolution, 2 J. AM. CULTURE 575, 575 (1980) (“[T]he
Indian was the child of Satan, and he was triumphed over, not by the captive, but by the Lord.”);
David L. Minter, By Dens of Lions: Notes on Stylization in Early Puritan Captivity Narratives,
45 AM. LITERATURE 335, 335 (1973) (stating narratives were “instruments of propaganda against
Indian ‘devils’”). A white person’s captivity “was transformed into an agonistic drama of colo-
nial struggle . . . with an opposition between the captive as isolated Western individualist and
the captors as representatives of an amorphous, alien, all-encompassing horde.” JOE SNADER,
CAUGHT BETWEEN WORLDS: BRITISH CAPTIVITY NARRATIVES IN FACT AND FICTION 7 (2000).
Teresa Toulouse argues that female captivity narratives help understand shifting and changing
conceptions of male authority. See generally TERESA A. TOULOUSE, THE CAPTIVE’S PO-
SITION: FEMALE NARRATIVE, MALE IDENTITY, AND ROYAL AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL NEW
ENGLAND (2007).
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given to despotism and slavery, while the captive’s struggle to escape often defined an
inborn liberty within the British people.”90 The stories reflected a deep irony: whites
derided kidnappings from indigenous or “barbaric” people, while at the same time
they turned a blind eye to the massive enslavement and forcible taking of blacks for
slave labor.91
Kidnapping began to become something different in America. In 1837, a New
Hampshire court observed that English law provided for a common law offense of
kidnapping, but the court found that neither the use of force or violence, nor trans-
portation to a foreign country were necessary elements of the offense.92 But even
though courts broadened the offense somewhat, it was not enforced equally.93 The
most common kidnappings, which involved whites taking free blacks—including
children—from Northern border states and selling them in the South, were not as
strongly enforced.94 Even though kidnapping clearly prohibited the sale of free
90 SNADER, supra note 89, at 5; see Tara Fitzpatrick, The Figure of Captivity: The Cul-
tural Work of the Puritan Captivity Narrative, 3 AM. LITERARY HIST. 1, 3 (1991) (“[T]he logic
of the captivity figure helped to transform the Puritan colonists’ image of the American wilder-
ness from a savage wasteland haunted by demonic adversaries to the ‘fresh, green breast’
from which European settlers might draw their virtuous sustenance, a virtue so powerful as
to restore the virginity of a continent now rid—figuratively and, increasingly, literally—of
its native inhabitants.”).
91 BAEPLER, supra note 89, at 231.
92 State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550, 550 (1837). To summarize the sentiments of the Supreme
Court of Texas from 1848, common law courts saw kidnapping as an aggravated kind of false
imprisonment which would require an assault and the carrying away of another into another
country against his will. See Click v. State, 3 Tex. 282, 282 (1848).
93 WILSON, supra note 22, at 9–18.
94 Id.; WITNESS FOR FREEDOM: AFRICAN AMERICAN VOICES ON RACE, SLAVERY, AND
EMANCIPATION 7 (C. Peter Ripley et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter WITNESS FOR FREEDOM]. It is
difficult to quantify the number of people kidnapped, given the sheer lack of documentation
and a kidnapped black person’s inability to take a case to the courts. As Ulrich Bonnell Phillips
put it in 1918, “Kidnappings without pretense of legal claim were done so furtively that they
seldom attained record unless the victims had recourse to the courts; and this was made rare
by the helplessness of childhood in some cases and in others by the fear of lashes.” ULRICH
BONNELL PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT
AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION RÉGIME 443 (1918).
[I]n the majority of cases the poor ignorant blacks, by fraud and deceit,
were inveigled into a trip south on a flat boat, or other errand, and at
some pre-arranged point on the river they would be turned over to con-
federates, forcibly and rapidly taken to the interior and there sold into
slavery . . . . Another mode was to seize a black and forcibly convey
him to a rendezvous either on the Ohio or Mississippi, but not out of
the State, where a confederate would appear and carry him beyond.
ALEXANDER DAVIDSON & BERNARD STUVÉ, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF ILLINOIS FROM 1673
TO 1873; EMBRACING THE PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY; ITS EARLY EXPLORATIONS;
ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS; FRENCH AND BRITISH OCCUPATION; CONQUEST BY VIRGINIA;
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blacks, once they were taken, blacks made little headway, finding that the “system
actually facilitated kidnapping” while most white Americans turned an apathetic (and
even supportive) eye.95 “[T]he parents of enslaved children had few legal rights [avail-
able] to them, and whatever rights they did have were seldom if ever enforced.”96
Whites “had the upper hand because they had the law on their side” and blacks had
few options.97
Blacks and other abolitionists called the practice what it was—kidnapping—and
protested the nation’s ambivalence to a massive problem.98 The anti-slave publica-
tion, Liberator, proclaimed in 1833, “We hold it to be a self-evident truth, that every
slave in the United States has been kidnapped.”99 Frederick Douglass said he knew
many who would “say that their fathers and mothers were stolen from Africa—
forced from their homes, and compelled to serve as slaves.”100 David Walker told the
Massachusetts General Colored Association in 1828 that he was sad to see “a gang
of villains, who, for the paltry sum of fifty or a hundred dollars, will kidnap and sell
into perpetual slavery, their fellow creatures!”101 “Will they not take our wives and
our little ones, more particularly our little ones,” he pled to the crowd and asked God
to “open our eyes on these children of the devil and enemies of all good!”102
TERRITORIAL CONDITION AND THE SUBSEQUENT CIVIL, MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS
OF THE STATE 319 (Springfield, Illinois Journal Co. 1874).
95 JORDAN, supra note 79, at 404 (discussing that lawmakers added penalties for kidnap-
ping free blacks); WILSON, supra note 22, at 2.
96 ROTHMAN, supra note 53, at 6.
97 Id.
98 “[P]erhaps not a day passes,” Thomas Cope wrote in his journal in 1803, where “free
blacks are stolen by force or decoyed by the most wicked artifices from the Northern & Middle
States & sold for slaves in the Southern.” THOMAS P. COPE, PHILADELPHIA MERCHANT: THE
DIARY OF THOMAS P. COPE, 1800–1851, at 137 (Eliza Cope Harrison ed., 1978); WILSON, supra
note 22, at 8. As Pennsylvania abolitionist John Parrish put it in 1806, “We permit six hundred
persons to be kidnapped in six months alone because people want to get rid of the free negroes.”
CAROLE C. MARKS, MOSES AND THE MONSTER AND MISS ANNE 29 (2009); JOHN PARRISH,
REMARKS ON THE SLAVERY OF BLACK PEOPLE 9–11 (Philadelphia, Kimber, Corald, & Co.
1806); WILSON, supra note 22, at 7.
99 The Firebrand–Number II, LIBERATOR, April 27, 1833, at 1; see also Impudence, LIBER-
ATOR, Feb. 26, 1831, at 34 (“It was thought kidnapping was not practised here. To the sorrow
of many of our citizens, the contrary is the fact; and not a season of sickness passes, but that
twenty or thirty slaves are carried off by steam boats, up the country, and by vessels to the
north. We do not charge this upon masters of boats or vessels, for we cannot believe they would
act in this manner, but our opinion leads us to suppose that even they, are made the dupes of
a set of canting scoundrels, who under the cloak of humanity rob their fellow creatures of their
all.”); see also WILSON, supra note 22, at 5–8.
100 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 122–23 (Humanity Books
2002) (1855).
101 David Walker, An Address to the Massachusetts General Colored Association (Dec. 19,
1828), reprinted in WITNESS FOR FREEDOM, supra note 94, at 38, 41.
102 Id.
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While many blacks attempted to win back their freedom in the courts, they found
few successes.103 A black kidnapping victim had the almost impossible task of
convincing the court that she was free.104 The legal hurdles were large: courts would
not let blacks testify or they would require the testimony of a white witness to prove
a person’s free status.105
The courts did, though, recognize that a free person could be kidnapped.106 In
1836, the circuit court in the District of Columbia accepted kidnapping as an offense
much broader than transporting a child to a new country.107 The court noted an in-
creased activity of persons who, by the court’s terms, would kidnap free black people
to sell as slaves in the South.108 That same year, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld
a kidnapping indictment when the defendant took a black woman, Susanna, from
Indiana to Kentucky, and in 1841, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dis-
cussed a kidnapping case where the defendants stole a black boy from Massachusetts
and took him to Virginia where he tried to sell the boy as a slave.109
The courts sometimes took the cases seriously. Captain John Miller hired a free
black, Abram Luomony, to sail from Philadelphia to help him collect wood.110 As
the boat sailed under a bridge, an accomplice jumped on it, where he and Miller beat
103 See WILSON, supra note 22, at 7.
104 [I]t was much safer to kidnap a free or formerly enslaved person rather
than someone who was currently a slave. A free person had a harder time
proving they were free than did a person who was known as a slave.
Moreover, a local slave owner would report their missing slave as a run-
away and would be on the lookout; a free person would be less likely
to be missed by neighbors.
Elisabeth McMahon, Trafficking and Reenslavement: The Social Vulnerability of Women and
Children in Nineteenth-Century East Africa, in TRAFFICKING IN SLAVERY’S WAKE: LAW AND
THE EXPERIENCE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN (Benjamin N. Lawrance & Richard L. Roberts
eds., 2012).
105 See, e.g., State v. Jeans, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 570, 570–72 (1847) (finding kidnapping required
evidence beyond the black kidnapped person’s testimony); see also State v. Harten, 4 Del.
(4 Harr.) 582, 582 (1847); State v. Griffin, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 560, 560 (1842); WILSON, supra
note 22, at 7, 49. As Solomon Northup wrote in his 1853 memoir, “[H]undreds of free citi-
zens have been kidnapped and sold into slavery, and are at this moment wearing out their lives
on plantations in Texas and Louisiana.” SOLOMON NORTHUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE: NAR-
RATIVE OF SOLOMON NORTHUP, A CITIZEN OF NEW-YORK, KIDNAPPED IN WASHINGTON CITY
IN 1841, AND RESCUED IN 1853, FROM A COTTON PLANTATION NEAR THE RED RIVER, IN
LOUISIANA 321 (Auburn, Derby & Miller 1855).
106 United States v. Henning, (Henning II ), 26 F.Cas. 267, 268, 4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 645
(D.C. Cir. 1836) (No. 15,349).
107 United States v. Henning (Henning I ), 26 F.Cas. 265, 265, 4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 608
(D.C. Cir. 1835) (No. 15,348).
108 Henning II, 26 F. Cas. at 647, 650.
109 State v. M’Roberts, 4 Blackf. 178, 178 (Ind. 1836); Commonwealth v. Turner, 44
Mass. (3 Met.) 19, 19–21 (1841).
110 WILSON, supra note 22, at 22.
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Luomony, robbed him of five dollars and a knife, tied him up, and sold him.111
Luomony managed to escape three days later and Delaware abolitionists helped him
return home.112 The legal system took action.113 Philadelphia’s mayor issued a war-
rant and Miller was indicted and convicted of kidnapping.114 The court sentenced
him to one year of hard labor and a one hundred pound fine.115
To obtain redress, blacks had to have the means to petition officials to act, a
large barrier, especially for one who had been kidnapped. One blacksmith named
Charles Covey wrote the governor of Georgia in 1853 that he had been taken and
carried to Missouri, whipped “untill my Back was Raw” and sold for fourteen hundred
dollars.116 Covey insisted the warrant was falsified and forged and asked the gover-
nor to look for his papers in the county clerk, Bozal Stuler’s office or ask “most any
man” in Milledgeville, Georgia if he were free.117 Covey pled that the governor “do
any thing for me in the way of Getting me my freedom Back a Gain” and not tell his
“Preseant mastear of these things.”118
Their cases required not only petitioning, but persistence. Sixty-five-year-old
Eulalie Oliveau, who had lived as a free black for forty-five years along with her seven
children and ten grandchildren, filed a petition in a New Orleans district court com-
plaining they had been “forcibly taken from their homes in said Parish at night by
certain armed persons” and sold into slavery.119 The court dismissed the family’s claim
one month later, on the defendants’ assertions.120 But Oliveau did not give up.121 She
was one of the few who achieved success when she won a suit for her family’s
freedom, but only after the case languished for three years in the Louisiana courts.122
Legislative and legal efforts were largely symbolic. In 1866, Congress proposed
legislation to prevent the kidnapping of free people and asked for a report from






116 PHILLIPS, supra note 94, at 442.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 ROTHMAN, supra note 53, at 28. The children’s names were Phrosine, Marie, Madeline,
Claire, Catherine, Henri, and Desiree. The grandchildren were four from Marie (Georgina,
Madeline, Zelina, Theogene), four from Madeline (Polite, Julie, Adelon, Gudora) and two from
Phrosine (George and Eleonore). Eulalie v. Long, 9 La. Ann. 9, 9 (1854); see also Eulalie v.
Long, 11 La. Ann. 463 (1856). The Liberator published an account of the “extensive kidnap-
ping” referring to charges that the two white men had previously “sold five kidnapped colored
persons in this city for Texas.” Extensive Kidnapping, THE LIBERATOR, March 25, 1853, at 3.
120 Eulalie, 9 La. Ann. at 11.
121 ROTHMAN, supra note 53, at 29.
122 Id.
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southern States.”123 Johnson provided a report ten days later that grossly minimized
what it called “the supposed kidnapping of colored persons,” referring only to one
specific case.124 The press “barely noticed” the report and Congress passed the law,
which “had no practical effect and was largely a symbolic antislavery gesture.”125
Blacks soon felt they had little choice to stem the widespread tide of slave-trade
kidnappings and began advocating stronger forms of resistance than those adopted
by their white abolitionist allies.126 They formed vigilance committees that offered
information about kidnappers, helped captives escape, and provided food, clothing,
shelter, and legal services.127 Many blacks felt this was not enough.128
The “moral weapons” had no use, one black leader said, “in defense against a
kidnapper or a midnight incendiary with a lighted torch in his hand[.]”129 When George
Jones, a free black man, was taken by “several notorious kidnappers” in New York
and the court instantly pronounced him an escaped slave on the kinappers’ word alone,
David Ruggles, leader of the New York Committee of Vigilance, complained that they
“have no protection in law—because the legislators withhold justice.”130 Blacks had to
take matters into their own hands. “[W]e must look to our own safety and protection
from kidnappers!,” he implored, “remembering that ‘self-defence is the first law of
nature.’”131 Frederick Douglass echoed the sentiments of many that the time for
action was now:
A good revolver, a steady hand, and a determination to shoot
down any man attempting to kidnap. Let every colored man
123 Id. at 181–82 (emphasis added).
124 Id. at 182–83. The case, and the enormous efforts Rose Herera made over three years
to recover her kidnapped children, are detailed in the Rothman text.
125 Id.
126 WITNESS FOR FREEDOM, supra note 94, at 15; see ROTHMAN, supra note 53, at 161–66.
“By the 1850s, however, violence seemed a more reasonable strategy” given that white masters
could “hunt for slaves in the North” and even “kidnap and enslave free blacks.” KORITHA
MITCHELL, LIVING WITH LYNCHING: AFRICAN AMERICAN LYNCHING PLAYS, PERFORMANCE,
AND CITIZENSHIP, 1890–1930, at 66 (2011). “At this point, new advocates for physical force
emerged to demand military training for African Americans. By 1861, more than 8,500 men
had joined black militia groups, and they were more than willing to fight when the Civil War
presented the opportunity.” Id. “[B]lacks, free and fugitive slave, fell under the scrutiny of
whites in antebellum America. Even when blacks and whites ostensibly worked together in
the same abolitionist cause, whites always had the upper hand.” Earl F. Mulderink, “The
Whole Town Is Ringing with It”: Slave Kidnapping Charges Against Nathan Johnson of New
Bedford, Massachusetts, 1839, 61 NEW ENG. Q. 341, 355 (1988).
127 WITNESS FOR FREEDOM, supra note 94, at 15; Julie Winch, Philadelphia and the Other
Underground Railroad, 111 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3 (1987).
128 See WITNESS FOR FREEDOM, supra note 94, at 15–16.
129 Id. at 162.
130 David Ruggles, Kidnapping in the City of New York, LIBERATOR, Aug. 6, 1836,
reprinted in WITNESS FOR FREEDOM, supra note 94, at 135–37.
131 Id. at 137.
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make up his mind to this, and live by it, and if needs be, die by
it. This will put an end to kidnapping and to slaveholding, too.132
Even though blacks actively fought their kidnappings in and out of American
courts throughout the nineteenth century, it was not until 1866 that the New York Times
reported its first official American kidnapping, this time of a white child, and the paper
averaged reporting a single case a year through the 1860s.133 Through the 1870s, the
number of reported kidnappings increased sharply—to as much as a dozen a year.134
The increased publicity given to the kidnapping of white children soon became
a “thrill as mass entertainment” where media often sensationalized its racialized
aspects.135 In 1870, for example, after the disappearance of a white Irish girl, Mollie
Digby, the state of Louisiana charged two black women with her kidnapping, and
massive publicity—indeed the “first kidnapping trial in American history to become
sensationalized national news”—created a moral panic that Digby had been used for
voodoo sacrifice.136 Prosecutors used the two defendants “as examples of a black
population that was out of control,” while newspapers fueled whites’ fears that
“black criminals had become emboldened and their crimes would go unpunished.”137
The taking of white children roused lawmakers, particularly the 1874 ransom kid-
napping of four-year-old Charley Ross in Philadelphia.138 Kidnappers lured Charley
and his six-year-old brother Walter, who were playing in front of their Germantown
mansion, with promises of candy or sweets.139 Though they returned Walter a few hours
later, the kidnappers held Charley hostage for six months, sent at least twenty-three
ransom letters to Charley’s father Christian, and eventually demanded the elder Ross
drop $20,000 from a moving train upon their signal, promising to return Charley
within ten hours.140 Christian Ross made the trip, but never received a signal.141
132 The True Remedy for the Fugitive Slave Bill, FREDERICK DOUGLASS’ PAPER, June 9,
1854, reprinted in WITNESS FOR FREEDOM, supra note 94, at 184.
133 ERNEST KAHLAR ALIX, RANSOM KIDNAPPING IN AMERICA, 1874–1974: THE CREATION
OF A CAPITAL CRIME 3 (1978).
134 Id.
135 CLAIRE BOND POTTER, WAR ON CRIME: BANDITS, G-MEN, AND THE POLITICS OF MASS
CULTURE 110–11 (1998) (“The history of [efforts to pass local antikidnapping statutes], as
well as the strong resemblance of kidnapping dramas to early American captivity narratives,
underlines the racial subtext of this crime.”).
136 MICHAEL A. ROSS, THE GREAT NEW ORLEANS KIDNAPPING CASE: RACE, LAW, AND
JUSTICE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 4, 211 (2015).
137 Id. at 109, 209.
138 Thomas Everly, Searching for Charley Ross, 67 PA. HIST. 376, 376 (2000); see also ALIX,
supra note 133, at 4. Michael Ross argues that the similarities between the Digby kidnapping
and the Charley Ross case “suggest the possibility that the Ross case was a ‘copycat’ crime.”
ROSS, supra note 136, at 211.
139 Everly, supra note 138, at 378, 381.
140 Id. at 378.
141 Id.
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The Ross case consumed the public and was at the time one of the largest
manhunts in American history.142 Sightings poured in from around the nation, from
Connecticut, West Virginia, Illinois, and even in Europe.143 The fervor died down
after Joseph Douglass—a petty thief—confessed to the kidnapping, along with his
now dead partner, William Mosher, on his deathbed following a failed burglary and
a gun battle with police.144
The New York Times commented, in reference to the Ross case, that kidnapping
was “sometimes resorted to in Europe” as “one of the rarest means adopted,” but
even though “[i]t is extremely unlikely that the child of any reader of this article will
be stolen from him,” it felt that there was now “evidence” that people would now
try to kidnap children from “none but the wealthy” to extort a ransom, apparently
oblivious to the cries of black men, women, and children.145
The Ross case and other kidnappings of white children created a culture of fear.
Charley Ross’s father said he was “America’s first kidnapped child” (a stunning ex-
clusion of thousands of kidnapped black people) and the case left a poignant lesson:
children should not take candy from strangers.146 Now legislators and politicians,
and “white people of status themselves” were able to create a sense of “a national
community of parents” which created the desire for a public response.147
The over-reporting of these offenses created the appearance of a serious prob-
lem, and the Times changed its tune. “It seems a poor State,” the paper said, “that
fails to furnish a stray child who answers in every respect the description of Charlie
Ross.”148 Six months later, the paper, along with much of the country, sternly
demanded tougher kidnapping legislation:
The abduction of Charlie Ross created some excitement . . .
because, perhaps, of the chord of sympathy which was struck in
the breast of every parent throughout the land. The excitement
too, was kept up by a chain of incidents, real or alleged, which
142 Id.; see also ALIX, supra note 133, at 6–7; Fisher & McGuire, supra note 31 (“[I]n 1874,
there occurred in the city of Philadelphia an event which focused the attention of the country
and the world upon the satanic atrociousness of this crime, and that was the kidnapping of
Charlie Ross.”).
143 ALIX, supra note 133, at 6–7; Everly, supra note 138, at 378.
144 Everly, supra note 138, at 378–80; see also ALIX, supra note 133, at 7.
145 A New Peril for Children, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1874, at 4.
146 Everly, supra note 138, at 381 (emphasis added). Paula Fass argues that the Ross case
set a pattern that others followed in future ransom kidnappings and that it “made clear that
the parent-child bond . . . was the most important and resolute of obligations and the most
necessary (if vulnerable) source of personal identity.” FASS, supra note 22, at 52; Everly,
supra note 138, at 382.
147 POTTER, supra note 135, at 111.
148 The Wisconsin Charlie Ross, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1875, at 1.
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occurred with it . . . . Since that event abductions . . . of young
children have been frequent . . . .
It is time, however, that the people . . . put[ ] a stop to the repetition
of crimes of this particular kind. Child-stealing is an offense which
should be productive of something more than a little public in-
dignation . . . . [A] severe example should be made of those who
indulge in it. If this cannot be done under existing laws, new
laws should be enacted for the purpose. Young children cannot
be expected to protect themselves against the machinations of
bad men and women; but they have a right to all the protection
which the law can give . . . . The public cannot afford to treat it
with indifference, for it is one of those things about which the
exercise of too much patience itself becomes a crime.149
Ransom kidnappings of white children continued to occur sporadically through-
out the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.150 The responses were much more
acute for the stolen white child. Fifteen-year-old Eddie Cudahy, the son of E.A.
Cudahy, a Nebraska millionaire meat packer, was kidnapped in December of 1900.151
The boy’s father paid a $25,000 ransom and insisted that the police not get involved,
and his son was returned.152 Though Cudahy offered a $25,000 reward for the kid-
nappers’ capture, the public demanded more.153
The public demanded action.154 Kidnapping under Nebraska law required trans-
portation out of state and child-stealing required the child to be under the age of ten,
neither of which applied in this case.155 Authorities believed that only a false imprison-
ment charge could be sustained, but it was only a misdemeanor with a minimal fine
and less than a year incarceration.156 As C.J. Richards wrote the New York Times, he
learned from the Cudahy case “with some astonishment, that there seems to be no
law under which the perpetrators of this dastardly deed could be adequately pun-
ished.”157 “There should be a law throughout the United States,” Richards insisted,
149 Child-Stealing, HARRISBURG DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 11, 1875, at 1; see also ALIX,
supra note 133 (“The hundreds of lost children mistakenly thought to be Charles Ross were
used by the media and authorities to dramatize the need for sterner measures to curtail the
crime of child stealing.”).
150 ALIX, supra note 133, at 8–16; Bickel, supra note 49, at 1338.
151 ALIX, supra note 133, at 16.
152 Id. at 17.
153 Id. at 17–18; Fisher & McGuire, supra note 31, at 650.
154 See infra Section I.B.
155 ALIX, supra note 133, at 17–18.
156 Id. at 18.
157 C.J. Richards, Death for Kidnappers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1900, at 6.
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“putting the penalty of capital punishment on the crime of kidnapping,” which he felt
“will serve to prevent [ ] crime,” and give parents the security for their children.158
Only a few days later, on December 26, 1900, legislatures in Iowa, Wisconsin,
South Dakota, North Dakota, and Wyoming were reported either criminalizing kid-
napping or making the existing crime punishable by death.159 Other state legislatures,
including Alabama, Indiana, Oklahoma, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee,
Delaware, and the District of Columbia followed suit in 1901 and 1902, again,
directly influenced by the Cudahy case.160
No one, however, appeared outraged with the continued kidnapping of black
people. In 1901, an Alabama constable took John Davis (along with other black
men) before he could make it home from picking cotton to see his sick wife and two
children.161 Ostensibly arresting Davis for obtaining goods under false pretenses, the
constable took Davis before a justice of the peace, who summarily found him guilty and
sentenced him to pay $75 or to work, “hard labor,” for buyers who had “advanced” the
fine.162 Since Davis had no money, he had no choice but to submit for as much as ten
years to a forced labor business.163 His kidnapping went unnoticed until two years
later.164 When a federal grand jury was convened to investigate allegations of slavery
in Alabama, Davis’s kidnappers suddenly let him go, claiming he was never held
involuntarily.165 Davis testified differently and said they forced him to sign a paper
in which he admitted his arrest was proper.166
But Davis was a black man. Perhaps the public would be more sympathetic to the
taking of a black child. In November 1903, the pastor of a black Baptist church, Rev.
L.R. Farmer, wrote the Department of Justice: “[I] [sic] have a little girl that has been
kidnapped from me and is now under bondage in Ga.”167 The distraught father wrote,
“and [I] cant get her out . . . .”168 Reverend Farmer had tried everything he could think
of: he reached out to local authorities and he tried to serve a writ of habeas corpus on
158 Id.
159 New Laws on Kidnapping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1900, at 1.
160 ALIX, supra note 133, at 19–20.
161 See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 117–54 (2012) (telling
Davis’s story throughout the chapter).
162 Id. at 126–32.
163 Id. at 132, 144. Kidnappers would often concoct a new offense toward the end of the
period a person was ordered to work in order to enable perpetual slavery. See id. at 137–38, 144.
A similar situation happened to Note Turke, who was taken from a public road by Burancas
Cosby and a gang of white men, locked in a corncrib, and when he refused to plead guilty to
their fabricated charge, was dragged before a justice of the peace and fined $15. Id. at 148–51.
164 Id. at 182.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 430 n.16
168 Id. at 254.
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her captors.169 “[T]his little of mine is begging me to come after,” he said, imploring
the government to help.170 He received a terse response: he would have to supply the
names of her kidnappers, the place she was held, and witnesses who could prove his
claims.171 The government took no other action.172
Again, kidnapping became an outrage when white children were stolen.173 In
1907, after one four-year-old boy, Horace Marvin, Jr., was taken from his family’s
Delaware property and never found, the President of the United States stepped in.174
President Theodore Roosevelt promised the family that “[a]nything that the Govern-
ment can do to help you will, of course, be done,” and soon the Indiana and Ala-
bama legislatures increased their penalties for kidnapping to make them “as severe
as possible.”175
These reactions occurred again and again for white children.176 After the ransom
kidnapping of eight-year-old Willie Whitla and his return after payment of a $10,000
ransom in 1909, the New York legislature passed a bill increasing kidnapping’s
punishment to fifty years.177 Commenting on the bill, the Senate chairman said that
“[k]idnapping is one of the most serious problems with which we are confronted to-
day. Our present laws, in view of the Whitla and other prominent cases, seem to be
insufficient for dealing with that which in all civilized countries is regarded as a
most heinous offense.”178 The case also “created much feeling in Congress” leading
to federal kidnapping legislation which made it punishable by death.179
In the first twenty years of the twentieth century, nineteen states and the District
of Columbia had created or modified kidnapping statutes in consequence of rare,
though highly publicized kidnappings.180 As the Supreme Court of Montana re-
flected on this trend in 1915, it observed that kidnapping “has been much extended
by statute” from the English common law.181
169 Id.
170 Id. at 430 n.16.
171 Id. at 254–55.
172 Id. at 255.
173 See discussion infra Section I.B.
174 ALIX, supra note 133, at 25.
175 Id. at 25–26; POTTER, supra note 135, at 111.
176 See discussion infra Section I.B.
177 ALIX, supra note 133, at 27–28.
178 Penalty Bills Introduced: One Makes Maximum Punishment in New York Life Im-
prisonment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1909, at 2; see ALIX, supra note 133, at 28.
179 Bill Introduced Providing Death Penalty for Kidnapping, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1909,
at 2; see ALIX, supra note 133, at 28–29.
180 ALIX, supra note 133, at 36–37; Nicholas N. Kittrie, Ransom Kidnapping in America, 71
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 654, 655 (1980) (reviewing ALIX, supra note 133) (“Despite the
periodic outbursts of dramatic cases, the American experience with ransom kidnappings has
been numerically small.”).
181 In re McDonald, 146 P. 942, 943 (Mont. 1915).
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Kidnapping changed in America. The offense was expanded and defined by the
taking of white children from their social elite parents.182 The offenses were used to
both speak to every white parent’s heart (your children, too, could be taken) and to
push to expand kidnapping’s definition to even the most incidental movements.
Even though kidnapping’s origins, including its almost complete neglect of an entire
race of people, have been long forgotten, the experience is “at the root of our soci-
ety.”183 From its inception, kidnapping has been used to protect white society, while
ignoring the black one. The offense would continue to follow that trend.184
C. The Lindbergh Case and Kidnapping’s Increasingly Vague Definition
Because whites were so infrequently kidnapped, one 1953 law review observed
that “[p]rior to the twentieth century kidnapping was a crime seldom committed.”185
But courts had to face problems from these legislative expansions. For example, in
1965, in People v. Levy, when a wealthy couple came home, two men forced them
back into their car, took over the vehicle, and made them ride twenty-seven city
blocks for twenty minutes while the men stole earrings, rings, and three hundred dol-
lars from them.186
The court reversed the kidnapping conviction.187 “[T]he crime of kidnapping
envisages the asportation of a person under restraint and compulsion,” the court said,
worrying that kidnapping’s statutory definition could “overrun several other crimes,
notably robbery and rape, and in some circumstances assault, since detention and
sometimes confinement, against the will of the victim, frequently accompany these
crimes.”188 The court found it unlikely that the legislature intended to make the
restraints and asportations incident to other crimes a separate kidnapping offense,
observing that “the case now before us is essentially robbery and not kidnapping.”189
But the legislature had done just that—kidnapping was already an extremely
overbroad offense. In Levy alone, the court upheld kidnapping convictions in one
case where the victim was forced to drive a mile before he pulled into a police booth
and in another where the incident lasted only two minutes.190 This prompted one
182 See discussion infra Section I.C.
183 FASS, supra note 22, at 11.
184 See discussion infra Section I.C.
185 A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20, at 540. Professor R. F. V. Heuston
argued in 1976 that kidnapping was not even an offense under English law. R.F.V. Heuston,
The English Law of Torts: A Comparative Introduction, 35 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 341, 342 (1976)
(reviewing REGINALD WALTER DIAS & BASIL MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS:
A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION (1976)).
186 204 N.E.2d 842, 843 (N.Y. 1965).
187 Id. at 845.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 844.
190 Id. (affirming the holdings in People v. Hope, 177 N.E. 402 (N.Y. 1931) and People
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commentator at the time to observe that “whether there was a kidnapping cannot be
determined from time and distance alone.”191
Levy was decades late to the game. “[T]he trend toward broadening the crime”
had grown so much that Levy was now an outlier: a simple detention or a slight
movement, without more, supported a kidnapping in most jurisdictions.192 Sporadic
kidnappings of whites occurred through the 1930s, such as the highly publicized
trial of Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold Jr. and gangster-related kidnappings, and
renewed calls for stronger legislation came before a somewhat reluctant House
Committee on February 26, 1932.193 But only five days later on March 2, 1932, Charles
Lindbergh’s baby was kidnapped—a “cultural and political turning point”—
prompting state and federal legislatures and courts to overreact and transform
kidnapping into the vague law that it is today.194 The case unleashed an enormous
v. Small, 10 N.E.2d 546 (N.Y. 1937)); id. at 845 (Burke, J. dissenting); see also Frank J.
Parker, Aspects of Merger in the Law of Kidnapping, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 530 (1970).
191 Parker, supra note 190, at 530.
192 A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20, at 541, 545; see Parker, supra
note 190, at 530 (“Since in 1965 a majority of states would have held the events in Levy to
constitute kidnapping, Levy is a clear departure from the traditional notion of the crime.”);
see also Comment, Room-to-Room Movement: A Risk Rationale for Aggravated Kidnaping, 
11 STAN. L. REV. 554, 555–56 (1959) (demanding a “more explicit legislative formulation”
of kidnapping since the statutory language “would encompass virtually all robberies [and
extortions], since it is difficult to envisage a robbery [or extortion] without some movement
or physical displacement”). But see Kidnap, 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 691 (1933)
(defining kidnapping as “steal[ing] or carry[ing] off (children or others) in order to provide
servants or labourers for the American plantations”). One scholar identified at least fifteen
types of kidnappings: white slavery, hostage, child stealing, domestic relations kidnapping,
kidnapping for rape or sexual assault, kidnapping for murder or nonsexual assault, kidnapping
for robbery, romantic kidnapping, ransom skyjacking, ransom kidnapping hoax, plot or abortive
ransom kidnapping, ransom threat for extortion, classic ransom kidnapping, miscellaneous
kidnappings. Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1931) (“The gist of [kidnapping]
is the forcible carrying out of the state . . . .”); State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550, 567 (1837) (“It
is even questionable whether it is necessary that a transportation to another state or country
should be in contemplation . . . .”); ALIX, supra note 133, at xvi–xvii; Janet Olsen, Case
Note, From Blackstone to Innis: A Judicial Search for a Definition of Kidnapping, 16
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367, 368 & n.11 (1982).
193 ALIX, supra note 133, at 38–67; POTTER, supra note 135, at 111; Bickel, supra note
49, at 1338–39; Fisher & McGuire, supra note 31, at 651.
194 POTTER, supra note 135, at 111–12; Bickel, supra note 49, at 1339; Fisher & McGuire,
supra note 31, at 653–54; Horace L. Bomar, Note, The Lindbergh Law, 1 L. CONTEMP. PROBS.
435, 435–36 (1934). Many writers contend “the creation of capital ransom laws in American
jurisdictions was primarily, if not exclusively, the result of outraged emotions provoked by
the Lindbergh case of March 1932.” ALIX, supra note 133, at xxv, 67. As one commentator put
it, “Had not Charles A. Lindbergh flown the Atlantic . . . a federal kidnaping statute might not
yet have been enacted.” Robert C. Finley, The Lindbergh Law, 28 GEO. L. J. 908, 908 (1940).
It was the Lindbergh kidnapping that awakened the American people to
the fact that they were face to face with a species of crime so revolting
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public outcry, in part because of the fame of the boy’s father and grandfather, who
were paragons of the white race.195 The public reacted harshly to the kidnapping of
the innocent child.196
Throughout the country, people demanded action, such as imposing the death
penalty or creating harsher legislation, leading legislatures around the nation to con-
vene emergency sessions to dramatically toughen their kidnapping statutes.197 President
Herbert Hoover ordered the largest manhunt in American history, utilizing the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Post Office, all 563 agents of the U.S. Prohibition
Bureau, the Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration Services, and the Washington,
D.C. police force.198 Even Will Rogers weighed in, recalling his visit with the baby
Lindbergh only two weeks earlier, telling the L.A. Times with clear racial undertones,
“Why don’t lynching parties widen their scope and take in kidnapings [sic]?”199
Congress responded to the outcry.200 In introducing a bill to make kidnapping
a capital offense, Representative John Cochran of Missouri read part of a radio
address he had given on the Columbia Broadcasting System on March 3, 1932.201
Cochran insisted they were “confronted with a situation that the State police are
unable to control.”202 “Would you,” he asked mothers in particular, “want brave
officers stopped at State lines because of red tape . . . ? Do you want ferreted out that
lowest of all criminals regardless in what State he or his foul companions seek ref-
uge?”203 “Never before in the history of our country,” he insisted, “have the people
been so aroused as they are to-day.”204 The Congress would do whatever it had to,
he swore: “I say when the time arrives that mothers fear to send their children to
school, then the time has arrived when thoughts of State rights and centralization of
power must be forgotten.”205
and which had assumed such proportions that it seemed that unless the
menace was met fearlessly and with a determination to end it, the very
sanction of the criminal law was threatened.
Fisher & McGuire, supra note 31, at 646.
195 Charles Lindbergh Jr.’s grandfather was United States Senator Dwight Morrow who
“may have been the most esteemed public servant in the country.” ALIX, supra note 133, at
67; see also THOMAS KESSNER, THE FLIGHT OF THE CENTURY: CHARLES LINDBERGH AND
THE RISE OF AMERICAN AVIATION 230 (2010).
196 See discussion infra Section I.C.
197  ALIX, supra note 133, at 68, 78; JIM FISHER, THE LINDBERGH CASE: A STORY OF TWO
LIVES 22 (1987); ROSS, supra note 136, at 224.
198 ALIX, supra note 133, at 68; FISHER, supra note 197, at 22; ROSS, supra note 136, at 224.
199 Will Rogers, Will Rogers Remarks, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1932, at 1.
200 See infra Section I.C.
201 75 CONG. REC. 5385 (1932).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 5385–86.
204 Id. at 5386.
205 Id.
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After the Lindbergh baby was found dead, Congress enacted a new statute, called
the Lindbergh Law, on June 22, 1932.206 The Lindbergh case pushed the nation’s
legal bodies to action. Throughout the 1930s, Congress and the states continued to
broaden and expand definitions of kidnapping, most notably, to remove minimum
distances for asportation and to eliminate or minimize the need for a restraint.207
The outcry penetrated the courts as well. Not immune itself to public sentiment,
the United States Supreme Court observed that “[k]idnaping by that time had be-
come an epidemic in the United States.”208 Other courts specifically commented on
the intensity of the public feeling regarding the Lindbergh case and how it led to
changes in kidnapping statutes.209
Legislatures and courts expanded kidnapping significantly and prosecutors
enforced it in such a way to “promote[ ] an act of collective violence” which were
used to establish social control and dominance.210 The Lindbergh Law focused on
“attack[ing] a crime that threatened wealthy Americans only—white people.”211
They gave little more than lip service to “not-quite-daily” kidnappings and lynch-
ings of blacks, which Ida B. Wells calculated amounted to more than ten thousand
between 1865 to 1895 alone.212 People hardly saw these as kidnappings. The “wave
206 Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326, 326 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201); 75 CONG. REC. 13,304 (1932); ALIX, supra note 133, at 71–75; FISHER, supra note
197, at 166; Finley, supra note 194, at 911; Olsen, supra note 192, at 369–70; Bomar, supra
note 194, at 436.
207 ALIX, supra note 133, at 78–124 (discussing federal efforts against kidnapping in the
1930s); Olsen, supra note 192, at 370–71, 370 nn.17–20, 371 nn.22–24 (citing state statutes).
In the three decades to follow, kidnappings seemed to decline and many assumed it was from
the federal government’s strong enforcement efforts which “made interstate kidnaping a
dangerous activity.” Bomar, supra note 194, at 435, 438–39; see also ALIX, supra note 133,
at 125–38 (discussing public perception of kidnapping in the early to mid 1940s).
208 Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 462 (1946).
209 E.g., State v. Taylor, 312 P.2d 162, 165 (Ariz. 1957) (“[W]e think the date of enactment
of our [kidnapping] law is highly significant, for the amendment to the Lindbergh Law in
1934 was followed in Arizona within the year . . . .”). A broader kidnapping statute “is to be
construed in the light of its contemporary historical background,” which was
[t]o reach and exterminate, through capital punishment, a predatory class
of organized criminals that had excited national attention by seizing
persons of wealth, reputation, or means and holding them captive until
an exorbitant money demand or pecuniary reward in the form of a ran-
som had been paid by the victims, his friends or relatives, as a condition
precedent to his being released.
Finch v. State, 156 So. 489, 491 (Fla. 1934); Olsen, supra note 192, at 372 n.27 (asserting
that “[j]udicial decisions have also served to enlarge the scope of already broad statutes” and
citing authorities).
210 ASHRAF H. A. RUSHDY, AMERICAN LYNCHING, at xii (2012); see LYNCHING IN AMERICA,
supra note 29, at 1–2 (2006).
211 LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 229.
212 Id. at 1–6; IDA B. WELLS, A RED RECORD: TABULATED STATISTICS AND ALLEGED CAUSES
OF LYNCHINGS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1892–1893–1894, at 75–81 (Chicago, 1895); see also
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of kidnappings, including the murder of the [Lindbergh baby] . . . frightened white
America a lot more than lynching did.”213
Two cases illustrate the disparity in priorities. On October 19, 1934, twenty-
three-year-old Claude Neal was arrested in Florida for the murder of a nineteen-
year-old white woman, Lola Cannidy.214 Because of the brewing potential for mob
violence, the sheriff took him across state lines to an Alabama jail.215 A mob stormed
the Alabama jail, kidnapped Neal and brought him “screaming and crying” to a waiting
car, where they drove him two hundred miles to some woods and “subjected [Neal] to
the most brutal and savage torture imaginable,” Howard Kester wrote to the NAACP.216
The group “cut off his penis” and made him eat it, cut off his testicles and made
him eat those too and say he “liked it.”217 They sliced his sides, stomach, and would
periodically cut off fingers.218 They burned Neal with hot irons, hung him by a tree to
the point of near choking and then dropped him back down.219 Finally, the mob tied
Neal to the back of a car and dragged him to the victim’s home, where a woman “drove
a butcher knife through his heart” and the crowd of 3,000 to 7,000 proceeded to muti-
late the body—even children drove stakes into it.220 Only the National Guard was able
to disperse the mob.221 No one was charged, even though “Neal’s killers definitely car-
ried him across a state line in violation of the Lindberg[h] [sic] Kidnapping Law.”222
The NAACP believed the Neal lynching and its brutality could help Congress
pass anti-lynching legislation, but they could already see the difference in priorities.223
When Charles Mattson, a ten-year-old boy of a white doctor, was kidnapped on
December 27, 1936, the case became another national media sensation.224 The FBI
MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN
BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1990, at 9 (2d ed. 1991) (“Between 1882 and 1903, 2,060 blacks were
lynched in the United States.”); MARGARET VANDIVER, LETHAL PUNISHMENT: LYNCHINGS AND
LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN THE SOUTH 28–49 (2006) (discussing the prolificness of lynching in
Tennessee). Wells likely overstated her numbers, though lynchings are difficult to quantify.
The Equal Justice Initiative estimates that between 1877 and 1950, there were at least 4,084
lynchings in twelve Southern states. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CON-
FRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (3d ed. 2017), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads
/2019/10/lynching-in-america-3d-ed-080219.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW4S-EJPU].
213 LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 229.
214 Howard Kester, The Marianna Florida Lynching, in LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra
note 29, at 229–30.
215 Id. at 230.
216 Id.




221 Id. at 232.
222 Id. For a discussion of the lynching, see JAMES R. MCGOVERN, ANATOMY OF A LYNCH-
ING: THE KILLING OF CLAUDE NEAL (2013).
223 LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 232.
224 Id.
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dispatched at least forty-five agents to Tacoma, Washington, even though the boy’s
body, when it was discovered, had never crossed state lines.225 Despite this discovery—
one that made the Lindbergh Law inapplicable—both J. Edgar Hoover and President
Franklin Roosevelt promised “all the facilities at the disposal of the Department of
Justice” to the case.226
Walter White, head of the NAACP, wrote Attorney General Homer Cummings
on December 29, 1936, that while he commended the Department of Justice for
assisting on the Mattson case, he was displeased that Cummings had previously re-
fused to provide the same support or seek to prosecute kidnappers on the Neal case,
even though the kidnappers in Neal clearly crossed state lines.227 White condemned
the Department of Justice for its blind disregard of black kidnappings:
The Action of the Department of Justice in the Mattson case
further substantiates the quite obvious conclusion that its agents
act on administrative interpretation of the law in white cases and
the strict letter of the law in Negro cases. The whole record of
the Department of Justice in the enforcement of the kidnapping
law indicates that it has established an administrative policy to
the effect that the Federal kidnapping law applies only to the
kidnapping of wealthy white citizens and white peace officers.228
Thus, as had happened again and again, even extremely brutal kidnappings and
lynchings of blacks barely registered a response or call to action, while the kidnapping
of the children of wealthy whites moved courts and legislatures to ever-expanding
kidnapping definitions.229 Those new definitions created a host of merger problems.230
D. Kidnapping’s Growing Vagueness Created a Merger Problem
Newly broadened statutes prohibited a kidnapping if there was “some slight con-
straint of the person”—a taking of some sort—and a detention or an asportation of
the most minor sort.231 Under the statutes, there was no indication of any minimum
period of detention; it could be “extremely short” such that “almost any detention
suffices—even one of a few minutes duration.”232 Other states did not require a
detention at all, so long as one had the intent to do so.233
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Letter from Walter White to Homer Cummings, Attorney Gen. (Dec. 29, 1936), re-
printed in LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 232–33.
228 Id. at 233.
229 Id.
230 See infra Section I.D.
231 A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20, at 542–44.
232 Id. at 544.
233 Id. at 545–47.
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Kidnapping’s definition became increasingly vague and “varied so widely from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction that generalization [was] difficult.”234 Courts all over the
nation started to find kidnappings where the movements were slight and inconse-
quential.235 Examples included crossing the street,236 a forced walk of eleven feet237
or fifty to seventy-five feet,238 making a person leave or go into a house,239 driving
from a parking lot to an alley,240 moving around the office or across the room,241 or
restraining a person on the bed with a pillow and hand.242 The Supreme Court of
Arizona even observed that its statute went so far as to penalize “‘standstill’ kidnap-
ing.”243 As that court later put it, “it is the fact of forcible removal, not the distance
involved, that establishes the crime of kidnapping.”244
And when defendants raised constitutional complaints to this massive over-
breadth, courts found few violations.245 The Supreme Court rejected a claim that kid-
napping should merge with murder because the offenses were separate and unique.246
This forced courts to focus their assessments on “how much [movement] was too
much[:] . . . what movement or restraint was necessary to commit the underlying
offense and what actions moved beyond that to warrant a kidnapping charge.”247
This debate is well-illustrated with a California case from 1950, People v.
Knowles.248 In that case, the defendant robbed a clothing store at gunpoint and
forced employees into a stockroom, where they took the employees’ wallets and
then made the employees return to open the cash register before they fled with
money and items of clothing.249 The defendant argued his conduct amounted to an
armed robbery, but not an additional kidnapping.250
234 ALIX, supra note 133, at xxiv.
235 See Parker, supra note 190, at 537–45 (comparing California and New York’s approaches
to merger); Prince, supra note 36, at 789–90.
236 People v. Raucho, 47 P.2d 1108, 1111–12 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
237 State v. Ayers, 426 P.2d 21, 24 (Kan. 1967).
238 People v. Melendrez, 77 P.2d 870, 871 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
239 People v. Oganesoff, 184 P.2d 953, 953 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); People v. Shields,
161 P.2d 475, 476 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945); People v. Cook, 64 P.2d 449, 449 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1937).
240 State v. Brown, 312 P.2d 832, 835 (Kan. 1957).
241 People v. Smith, 482 P.2d 655, 656 (Cal. 1971) (reversing kidnapping conviction).
242 Miller v. State, 124 So. 3d 395, 396–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (reversing kidnap-
ping conviction).
243 State v. Taylor, 312 P.2d 162, 165 (Ariz. 1957).
244 State v. Jacobs, 380 P.2d 998, 1002 (Ariz. 1963) (citing People v. Wein, 326 P.2d 457
(Cal. 1958); People v. Chessman, 238 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1952)).
245 See, e.g., Jacobs, 380 P.2d at 1002–03.
246 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584–87 (1959).
247 Prince, supra note 36, at 790.
248 217 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1950); see also Bickel, supra note 49, at 1343–46 (discussing the
Knowles decision and the impact it had on the legislature).
249 Knowles, 217 P.2d at 2.
250 Id. at 3.
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While the defendant conceded that the legislature had deliberately amended the
kidnapping statute to abandon “the requirement of movement of the victim” which
had traditionally been a part of kidnapping analysis, he argued that kidnapping
should only apply to seizures or detentions that were incident to a “traditional act
of kidnapping.”251
Knowles argued that “the wave of public indignation at the widespread kidnap-
ping for ransom during the early nineteen-thirties” improperly motivated the stat-
ute.252 The court agreed that this may have been the case, but observed the legislature
could have had numerous other reasons, such as “rampant and terrorizing armed rob-
bery” for amending the statute.253 Even though Knowles’s “seizure and confinement
were an inseparable part of the robbery,” the court still sustained only a kidnapping
conviction.254
But Justice Edmonds was not convinced.255 He saw a “startling innovation in
criminal law that an act which constitutes robbery is also kidnaping.”256 “As an act
of robbery now will also constitute a kidnaping,” and because kidnapping carried
a potential death sentence and robbery a sentence of five years to life, Edmonds
feared that “many charges of attempted robbery, and every one of robbery, inevita-
bly will be prosecutions for a crime which may be punishable by death.”257
Justice Edmonds noted that California had two kidnapping statutes, one that
followed the more traditional common law definition and another “of comparatively
recent origin.”258 But kidnapping, Edmonds noted, is “deeply and inescapably
attached to its historical basis” and it behooved the court to thoroughly understand
and appreciate that background.259 Edmonds discussed some of its history and
observed that after the Lindbergh kidnapping, in “this nationwide atmosphere of
public alarm,” California, along with “almost all of the other states,” systematically
broadened their statutes.260
Justice Edmonds found that some courts had taken steps to put “reasonable
limitations” on broadly worded kidnapping statutes.261 Particularly, he noted that the
United States Supreme Court had also pushed back on this trend in a case where
Mormon fundamentalists were prosecuted under the Federal Kidnaping Act for
251 Id. at 3–4.
252 Id. at 6.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 7–9.
255 Id. at 9–18 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 9–10.
257 Id. at 10.
258 Id. at 11–12. With the addition, not in Blackstone, that the person “carries him into
another . . . county, or into another part of the same county.” Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
259 Id. at 12.
260 Id. at 12–14.
261 Id. at 14–15.
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transporting a fifteen-year-old girl to Mexico to engage in a polygamous marriage.262
In that case, the Supreme Court observed that Congress chose “[c]omprehensive
language” to “cover every possible variety of kidnaping.”263 “But the broadness of
the statutory language does not permit us to tear the words out of their context, using
the magic of lexigraphy to apply them to unattractive or immoral situations lacking
the involuntariness of seizure and detention which is the very essence of the crime
of kidnaping,” the Court affirmed.264 It noted:
Were we to sanction a careless concept of the crime of kidnaping
or were we to disregard the background and setting of the Act
the boundaries of potential liability would be lost in infinity . . . .
The absurdity of such a result, with its attendant likelihood of
unfair punishment and blackmail, is sufficient by itself to fore-
close that construction.265
Justice Edmonds agreed.266 This was clearly an armed robbery, but only by
“strained construction” of the statute could the court find a “kidnaping for the pur-
pose of robbery.”267 “The dominant act was the robbery” and any movement was
incidental and “not a considered and essential prelude to the robbery.”268 “[U]ntil
now,” Edmonds lamented, “the court has not held that the same act may constitute
both kidnaping and robbery.”269
In Knowles, Justice Carter wrote a separate dissent adding an additional concern.
He observed that a prosecutor now had the ability, “at his whim or caprice” to
charge either a robbery, which had a potential minimum sentence of one year, or to
charge an additional kidnapping, which faced the death penalty, for the exact same
conduct.270 “All these things could occur on the identical set of facts which establish
only robbery,” and he lamented that “[i]t is not to be supposed that the Legislature
intended to place any such drastic and arbitrary power in the hands of the district
attorney.”271 This was a frequent criticism of these statutes.272
262 Id.; see Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 457–58 (1946).
263 Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 463.
264 Id. at 464.
265 Id. at 464–65.
266 Knowles, 217 P.2d at 15.
267 Id.
268 Id. (emphasis added)
269 Id. at 17.
270 Id. at 18 (Carter, J., dissenting).
271 Id.
272 See Parker, supra note 190, at 543–44 (“It is next to impossible to conceive of a rape,
assault, or armed robbery in which physical force is not used or threatened. In each of these
instances, the district attorney is now free to press the grand jury for a . . . kidnapping
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In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court, reflecting on this massive transition, recog-
nized that kidnapping had changed such that a “literal application” of a kidnapping
statute could transform virtually every “host crime”—as it called crimes such as
robbery or rape—into a kidnapping as well.273 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
saw it the same: “virtually every false imprisonment, assault, battery, rape, robbery,
escape or jail delivery” met kidnapping’s definition, and because it “overruns other
crimes for which the prescribed punishment is less severe, a prosecutor has the
‘naked and arbitrary power’ to choose the crime for which he will prosecute.”274
Despite these concerns, courts did little to restrain the expansion.275 They
demonstrated a “consistent tendency to sustain prosecutions” using a bit of “judicial
juggling” and “legalomania” to affirm convictions in what was a “definite departure
from the English common law.”276 Courts juggled themselves into tests—common
law merger tests—to try to distinguish a kidnapping from the underlying offense.277
As one court put it:
The merger doctrine was of judicial origin and was based on an
aversion to prosecuting a defendant on a kidnapping charge in
order to expose him to the heavier penalty thereby made available,
where the period of abduction was brief, the criminal enterprise
in its entirety appeared as no more than an offense of robbery or
rape, and there was lacking a genuine “kidnapping” flavor.278
indictment.”); cf. State v. Johnson, 170 A.2d 830, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961)
(explaining since the kidnapping statute does nothing to exclude a kidnapping from a rape
offense, it “places upon the prosecution the moral obligation not to indict . . . unless the
crime warrants such severe punishment”).
273 State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1981). As one commentator suggested, courts
should consider requiring kidnapping to have more than incidental movement, considering that
virtually all offenses at least have some “genuine kidnapping flavor.” Parker, supra note 190, at
545; see People v. Miles, 245 N.E.2d 688, 695 (N.Y. 1969) (“[The kidnapping merger test ]was
designed to prevent gross distortion of lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by excess
of prosecutorial zeal. It was not designed to merge ‘true’ kidnappings into other crimes
merely because the kidnappings were used to accomplish ultimate crimes of lesser or equal
or greater gravity.”).
274 State v. Dix, 193 S.E.2d 897, 903–04 (N.C. 1973).
275 See Finley, supra note 194, at 916–17.
276 Id. at 916–18, 921, 926.
277 Moore v. State, 329 A.2d 48, 53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Olsen, supra note 192,
at 379–80.
278 People v. Cassidy, 358 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1976). The court continued:
The merger doctrine is intended to preclude conviction for kidnapping
based on acts which are so much the part of another substantive crime that
the substantive crime could not have been committed without such acts
and that independent criminal responsibility may not fairly be attributed
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But a 1953 law review note saw the problems already.279 Since “virtually all
conduct within the scope of kidnapping law is punishable under some other criminal
provision,” and the law allowed the charge in any case with a detention, kidnapping
was only defensible if the asportation or detention “significantly increases the dan-
gerousness or undesirability of the defendant’s behavior.”280
The note used two cases to illustrate that merger tests were not fixing the dif-
ficulties.281 In State v. Berry, the defendant had whipped his wife into confessing to
an affair with a man named Baker.282 Berry and some accomplices kidnapped Baker
from his home in front of his wife and children, tied him up, and dragged him to a
wood, where they struck him repeatedly in the face with their fists, a flashlight, and
a revolver, until he lost consciousness.283 For one hour, Berry kicked Baker in the
groin, mercilessly whipped his bare back, and grabbed a surgeon’s knife to castrate
him.284 Berry’s accomplices stopped the castration, but Berry cut Baker’s pants,
exposing his genitals, and holding Baker’s testicles in his hand, “stuck [sic] them
forcibly several times with the pliers” and “employing the same pliers, tore off
Baker’s foreskin.”285 They taped Baker’s eyes and mouth closed and left him “beaten,
bleeding and semi-conscious.”286
In People v. Kuntzsch, by contrast, a defendant forced a woman to accompany
him from Manhattan to Brooklyn where he made her join his labor union, stay four
hours for a union meeting, and then released her.287
The problem was stark. Under courts’ kidnapping tests, Kuntzsch’s case was the
more serious, since the detention was longer and the distance taken greater.288 This
to them. “It is this kind of factual merger with the ultimate crime of the
preliminary, preparatory, or concurrent action that the rule is designed to
recognize, and thus prevent unnatural elevation of the ‘true’ crime to
be charged. It is a merger suggestive of, but not quite like, the merger
of the preparation and attempt with the consummated crime, a familiar
concept in the criminal law.”
Id. at 873.
279 See generally A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20.
280 Id. at 556.
281 Id. at 557.
282 93 P.2d 782, 785 (Wash. 1939).
283 Id. at 786.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 786–87.
286 Id. at 787.
287 64 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118–19 (Kings Cty. Ct. 1946) (“A literal reading of the statute makes
a wilful seizure with intent to confine, against the will of the person seized, a kidnapping.
Such a literal construction can be carried to absurd extremes. . . . The Court in construing the
Statute should keep in mind the penalty imposed for violation of the statute. The crime is
most serious.”).
288 A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 20, at 557.
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was a major issue, since hinging a kidnapping on detention or asportation had
nothing to do with the dangerousness of the act and allowed serious sanctions to be
“imposed for conduct of relatively little seriousness.”289 The law review note
suggested that other factors were more indicative of a kidnapping: 1) how the victim
is controlled; 2) “the duration of that control”; and 3) “the nature of the defendant’s
purpose.”290 Consequently, it suggested eliminating kidnapping as a separate of-
fense, but to use kidnapping-like conduct to elevate or aggravate a person’s sen-
tence, say for assault, robbery, or rape.291 The coming decades would only make
matters worse.
E. Kidnapping Merger Tests Do Not Solve the Real Problems
Courts’ merger tests, unfortunately, have been “as vague and broad as the statutes
[they were] designed to clarify.”292 If state legislatures and Congress were trying to
fix the problem of kidnapping, their statutory definitions amounted to an overreac-
tion to the highly publicized takings of white children and their vagueness makes
them unconstitutional and prime vehicles for continued discrimination against
minorities or unpopular groups.
As one jurist put it, kidnapping merger has received massively “uneven treat-
ment.”293 Courts have not been able “to establish a coherent approach to the matter.”294
An almost seven-hundred-page article in American Law Reports (ALR) illustrates the
tremendous difficulties courts have had articulating and applying a test in this area
of the law.295 I will detail the various approaches, but in the end conclude that none
of them remedy the constitution at problems created by legislatures’ poor drafting.296
1. The Blockburger or “Same Elements” Test
In Blockburger v. United States,297 the United States Supreme Court articulated
a merger test that has been much of the basis for merger analyses since. Its “same
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 558.
292 Olsen, supra note 192, at 382.
293 Commonwealth v. Campbell, 505 A.2d 262, 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (Wieand, J.,
concurring).
294 Antkowiak, supra note 39, at 261.
295 See generally Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Seizure or Detention for Purpose of
Committing Rape, Robbery, or Other Offense as Constituting Separate Crime of Kidnapping,
39 A.L.R. 5th 283.
296 See infra Section I.E.
297 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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elements test” provides that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a viola-
tion of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not.”298 But, in trying to fix the problems with this test, the
Court reversed itself twice.299
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been roundly criticized as “flawed
guidance” that “has been marked by shifting tests and changes of direction . . . .
[M]iring the courts in a swamp of confusion.”300 Blockburger is too easy to circum-
vent: modern statutory provisions often have very minor variations in elements that
“allow prosecutors to break a single criminal episode into numerous crimes that are
separate offenses.”301
Because Blockburger “rests on assumptions that were made by courts develop-
ing double jeopardy protection in the era of common law crimes,” its premises “do
not necessarily survive in an era of legislatively defined offenses.”302 As has been
demonstrated here, legislatures have “exercise[d] little self-restraint, adding statu-
tory provisions targeting conduct that is already criminal and creating overlapping
offenses.”303
298 Id. at 304.
299 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688 (1993).
300 Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A
Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L. J. 1183, 1187 (2004); see also Nancy Ehrenreich, Attempt,
Merger and Transferred Intent, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 49, 90 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has left a “troubled and byzantine body of double jeopardy jurisprudence”); Jane A.
Minerly, Comment, The Interplay of Double Jeopardy, the Doctrine of Lesser Included
Offenses and the Substantive Crimes of Forcible Rape and Statutory Rape, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
1103, 1122 (2009); Marc E. Nolan, Comment, Diverging Views on the Merger of Criminal
Offenses: Colorado Has Veered Off Course, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 523, 547 (1995) (stating
that the test has been “increasingly criticized as not coping satisfactorily with the problem it was
designed to solve”). The test has also been criticized as “difficult to administer in practice.”
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 185 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
301 Poulin, supra note 300, at 1214 & n.157 (citing Dixon, 509 U.S. at 749 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (summarizing Justice Souter’s opinion as
“condemning Blockburger [for] offering too little protection”); see also State v. Vassos, 579
N.W.2d 35, 41 (Wis. 1998) (Bradley, J., concurring) (criticizing holding as “result[ing] in the
hollow protection of a fundamental constitutional right” and arguing that defendant deserves
more protection than Blockburger provides); State v. Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d 712, 724 (Wis.
1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (stating that Blockburger “is not sufficiently refined to
cope with the plethora of criminal statutes now crowding the statute books”).
302 Poulin, supra note 300, at 1214; see also Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 306 (Alaska
1970) (“As the separate violations multiply by legislative action, the likelihood increases that a
defendant will actually be punished several times for what is really and basically one crimi-
nal act.”).
303 Poulin, supra note 300, at 1188–89.
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Robberies, rapes, or sexual assaults do not require movement or restraint as part
of their elements, which kidnapping does, even though these type of detentions or
restraints necessarily accompany those crimes.304 Thus, Blockburger will never
address the real problem. Legislatures have done little to either make a less duplica-
tive code or to address merger issues and they have little incentive to do so.305
As has been shown here, legislatures are pressured by political forces, media
sensationalism, or the expediency of a high-profile case to broaden kidnapping and
yet they rarely act to repeal an offense.306 “As a result, criminal codes have devel-
oped without sufficient concern for coherence or coordination.”307
The Blockburger test “virtually annuls the constitutional guarantee,” Justice
Brennan said.308 The test can be easily circumvented when a prosecutor uses “related
statutory provisions that, intentionally or by happenstance, differ in some small but
essential element of proof.”309 A single murder, rape, robbery, or assault, for example,
can easily carry a kidnapping offense along with it.310 Because common law crimes
are no longer simple and well-delineated, Blockburger can no longer control. Case after
case demonstrates how a single criminal act can lead to multiple punishments.311
The Blockburger test substantially weakens the role of the judiciary—it “em-
powers lawmakers to overrule the Double Jeopardy Clause” and provides absolutely
no check on prosecutorial abuse.312 In other words, Blockburger only prevents one
kind of abuse: when the State seeks to charge the same exact legislative offense
304 See Olsen, supra note 192, at 384.
305 See State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90–91 (1993) (“[The Blockburger test] is essentially
the same as that in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3).”); Poulin, supra note 300, at 1189–90.
306 See Poulin, supra note 300, at 1189–90; Teresa L. Welch & Samuel P. Newton, The
History and Problems of Utah’s Sex Offender Registry: Why a Move from a Conviction-
Based to a Risk-Assessment Approach Better Protects Children, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 1105, 1105
(2011) (demonstrating that Utah’s expanding sex offender laws were largely motivated by
several high profile cases).
307 Poulin, supra note 300, at 1190.
308 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 451 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
309 Poulin, supra note 300, at 1215.
310 See id.; see also Barksdale v. State, 788 So. 2d 898, 910 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (up-
holding two convictions for single murder because one was murder during a robbery and the
other was murder with a deadly weapon); State v. Whipper, 780 A.2d 53, 91–92 (Conn. 2001)
(finding defendant’s double jeopardy rights violated by three convictions (murder, felony murder,
and manslaughter) for a single death); State v. Thomas, 772 A.2d 611, 618 (Conn. App. Ct.
2001) (holding that double jeopardy protection precluded sentencing defendant to four murder
sentences for killing two victims).
311 See generally United States v. Turner, 130 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 1997); State v. Burns,
877 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1994); Poulin, supra note 300. See Minerly, supra note 300, at 1123–24
(observing that a defendant could be charged with statutory rape, forcible rape, and statutory
rape by an authority figure if he were a schoolteacher who raped a student).
312 Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 351, 371 (2005); see also Poulin, supra note 300, at 1217.
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repeatedly. But it would never prevent a prosecutor from adding a kidnapping
charge onto a robbery charge solely on the basis of race. Since kidnapping has dif-
ferent elements, a prosecutor can always charge it without repercussions.
2. Evidence-Based Test
Some courts look beyond the elements to the facts supporting the crimes.313
Under this test, courts look at the particular facts and see if those same facts could
support more than one charge.314 For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
merged a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon and felonious use of a firearm
conviction because, though each had separate elements, both counts relied on the
same factual evidence that the defendant used a gun to commit the robbery.315
But a test that focuses entirely on the underlying facts is just as easily circum-
vented as Blockburger. A prosecutor need only point to different or alternative evi-
dence.316 Of course, courts can engage in fact-intensive inquiries but they are also
too variable to create some consistency and are just as equally unlikely to root out
discriminatory motives.
3. Kidnapping Tests
Finally, courts have adopted tests more specifically tailored to kidnapping.317
There are largely three variations.318 All the tests determine whether a confinement
or a movement is sufficient to separate kidnapping from the host crime.319 The first,
and majority, test looks to whether the movement or confinement was “incidental”
to the underlying felony or whether it was “significant enough” to be independent.320
The second test adds to the first the element whether the movement “substantially
increased the risk of harm.”321 The third “more formulaic” tests add a host of other
factors, such as the nature of the movement, whether it facilitated a crime, prevented
the victim from receiving help, lessened the risk of detection, or created a danger or
313 See Poulin, supra note 300, at 1229; see also Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 54
(Ind. 1999); State v. Ringuette, 697 A.2d 507, 509 (N.H. 1997).
314 Nolan, supra note 300, at 552.
315 Heald v. Perrin, 464 A.2d 275, 277–78 (N.H. 1983).
316 Poulin, supra note 300, at 1230.
317 Wozniak, supra note 295, at 357.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 356–57; see, e.g., Alam v. State, 776 P.2d 345, 349 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (stating
courts “apply a merger doctrine whereby the kidnapping merges into the other crimes when
restraint is merely incidental to their commission”).
321 Wozniak, supra note 295, at 357.
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increased the risk of harm.322 “Courts have also considered the length of time the
victim was held or moved, the distance the victim was moved, and the location and
environment of the place the victim was detained.”323
In one Utah case, Justice Lee articulated the problems with courts’ merger
tests.324 “None of [the factors] provide meaningful guidance or means of predictably
distinguishing properly merged offenses from those that should not merge; collec-
tively, they render our inquiry into common-law merger unworkable.”325
To incidental movement, Justice Lee argued that the
inquiry is hardly an objective one. Slightness is in the eye of the
beholder. As to consequentiality, I would think that any deten-
tion that allows a defendant to commit a crime would be a matter
of consequence. So how this element may play out in individual
cases is anyone’s guess.326
Justice Lee observed that confinement may not be inherent in any crime.327 A
person may kill or rape a person without any sort of detention.328 “So this element
makes no sense,” he argued, and it “compounds the unpredictability of the inquiry.”329
Justice Lee also critiqued trying to analyze the case with a risk assessment.330
“This inquiry is puzzling. It will always be substantially easier to commit a murder
(or sexual assault) if the perpetrator has confined the victim to the extent required
for kidnapping. So the last element again provides no basis for distinguishing
properly merged offenses from those that should not merge.”331
An analysis of the nearly seven-hundred-page article ALR details the numerous
cases from all fifty states to interpret kidnapping merger shows there has been abso-
lutely no consistency on any topic or on any prong of any test.332 The annotation
breaks down the offense by two primary categories: robbery and sexual assaults, but
322 Id.
323 Id. at 358.
324 Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, ¶ 126, 388 P.3d 447, 476 (Lee, J., concurring).
325 Id. at 478.






332 See generally Wozniak, supra note 295. For example, a review of a thirty-page Court
of Appeals of Washington opinion reveals the difficulty one state court system has had with
applying the merger doctrine. State v. Phuong, 299 P.3d 37, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); see also
Thomas J. Crabtree, Kidnapping in Oregon: Resurrecting the Chessman Rule, 15 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 23, 23 (1978).
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it also considers assaults, burglary, child abuse, escape, ransom, homicide, kidnap-
ping and menacing.333 For the two major categories, each offense has been broken
further down to where it occurred: an office or business, at the victim’s or defen-
dant’s residence, other buildings, vehicles, and parks, for a total of eighty-one cate-
gories.334 Then, in most every category, the annotation indicates cases where the
movement or restraint was found to be a separate kidnapping and a second category
where it was not found to merge.335
The annotation cites Percy Wilder’s case—the case discussed at the first of this
Article—for an example of non-merger, but the annotation gives several examples
of cases where similar cases merged.336 For example, one Colorado case is star-
tlingly similar to Wilder.337 There, a schoolteacher left the school late one evening
and was walking to her car when the defendant “struck her, tore at her clothes, and
dragged her back to the school yard where he took her small backpack.”338 She tried
to run and “[h]e caught her and repeatedly hit her head against a retaining wall,
saying ‘[s]ee if you ever run away again.’”339 “He then dragged her to another part
of the well lighted school ground, and sexually assaulted her.”340 In that case, unlike
Wilder, the court found the kidnapping charge merely incidental to the sexual assault
and robbery.341
The problem with these tests is clear: courts are all over the map. On the same
offense, with the same or similar facts, courts have made inconsistent findings, even
333 Wozniak, supra note 295, at 357.
334 Id. at 357 nn.5–6.
335 Id. at 358 n.7.
336 Id. at 669–71.
337 See generally People v. Bridges, 612 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1980).
338 Id. at 1112.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 [T]he movement of the victim had no other purpose or effect beyond
robbery and sexual assault. This conclusion is supported by the circum-
stances surrounding the incident: the brief time of detention, movement
for short distances only, unchanged environmental factors, simultaneous
crimes and movement, and the fact that the defendant’s actions were
consistent with no independent intent to kidnap the victim.
Id. at 1116–17. Several other cases were strikingly similar to Wilder. See, e.g., Messer v.
Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1014 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The Court believes, however, that moving
the victim 15 feet did not make the crime of aggravated battery ‘substantially easier of
commission’ . . . . This movement, in the Court’s view was ‘slight, inconsequential and
merely incidental’ to the crime of aggravated battery.”); Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 959
(Del. 1988) (finding that defendant’s grabbing of escaping victim by the hair or neck and
dragging her back were only incidental to the assault and not sufficient for kidnapping);
People v. Cassidy, 358 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1976) (finding merger appropriate where the
defendant dragged victim to location to sexually assault her).
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in individual states. “[T]he case law demonstrates that courts have an inability to
apply the statutes fairly and with appropriate attention to defendants’ rights. It makes
kidnapping barely more than a legal fiction when the slightest restraint during a
robbery can warrant that label.”342
4. The Problem of Tracking Kidnapping
Not only are there problems with merger tests, but it is difficult to track or
demonstrate how frequently kidnapping occurs or is prosecuted in the United States.
Because there has been limited research and because the media covers only excep-
tional cases, there are “misconceptions about the nature of kidnapping in the United
States.”343 As two researchers put it, “in the context of fear and hysteria engendered
by a few sensational cases, policy makers have hastily enacted a number of ‘memo-
rial crime control’ policies” that are “out of proportion to the actual frequency” of
kidnapping.344 This amounts to a kind of “crime control theater” in which policy
makers can look as if they address the problem, but in reality create “socially
constructed ‘solution[s]’ to a socially constructed problem” which “trump[s] ob-
jective reality and result[s] in ill-conceived and sometimes destructive societal
responses.”345
Confusion “about the definition of kidnaping,” given its broad applicability,
“has been exacerbated by the absence of reliable statistics about the crime.”346
Kidnapping is not tracked in either the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) or the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and “individual States or other
jurisdictions have rarely made any independent tally of kidnaping statistics.”347
Even with what little data we have, researchers have been troubled by its “in-
ability to capture information about multiple crimes in a single case, or co-occurring
342 Prince, supra note 36, at 818. One commentator suggested courts consider a host of
factors in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Olsen, supra note 192, at 386–87; see
also People v. Adams, 205 N.W.2d 415, 422–23 (Mich. 1973) (describing a six-factor test to
interpret part of Michigan’s kidnapping statute). Such an approach would only further com-
plicate an already muddy and unclear area of the law.
343 Marie Skubak Tillyer et al., The Nature and Influence of the Victim-Offender
Relationship in Kidnapping Incidents, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 377, 377 (2015).
344 Timothy Griffin & Monica K. Miller, Child Abduction, AMBER Alert, and Crime
Control Theater, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 159, 159 (2008).
345 Id. at 161, 172.
346 FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note 42, at 1; see also Monique C. Boudreaux et al.,
Child Abduction: An Overview of Current and Historical Perspectives, 5 CHILD MAL-
TREATMENT 63, 64–65 (2000).
347 Tillyer et al., supra note 343, at 377; see also FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note 42,
at 1.
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crimes,” and its failure to include information on the offender’s or the victim’s
ethnicity.348
Even so, the limited data supports that kidnapping has a coexistence problem
with other offenses.349 For example, one study found that forty-eight percent of rapes
involve a concurrent kidnapping because “common attributes” of rape “readily
comport with the kidnapping definition.”350
We know that most kidnappings are familial in nature and are more likely to be
perpetrated by females, though males typically perpetrate the much more limited
stranger kidnappings involving children.351 The research supports that an offender’s
race affects crime rates and police willingness to clear an offense.352 For example, police
are less likely to make an arrest for a white-on-black or black-on-black crime than
a black-on-white crime.353 And, while some of the results have been mixed, scholars
348 Tillyer et al., supra note 343, at 377; see FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note 42, at 4
(“[N]onfamily kidnaping is generally associated with other offenses, such as robbery or
sexual assault, and is in fact a means of facilitating those offenses.”); Boudreaux et al., supra
note 346, at 64.
[J]urisdictions may vary in how regularly they charge offenders with
the crime of kidnaping. The elements of kidnaping exist in a wide
range of criminal incidents—sexual assaults, robberies, and physical
assaults—yet some jurisdictions, for a variety of possible reasons such
as training, tradition, or local statutes, may charge or record the crime
of kidnaping more or less frequently than other crimes.
FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note 42, at 2.
349 See FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note 42, at 4–5; Tillyer et al., supra note 343, at 378
(“There is little systematic research . . . on the extent and correlates of sexual victimization
in kidnapping incidents, including the role of the victim-offender relationship.”).
350 Lynn A. Addington & Callie Marie Rennison, Rape Co-occurrence: Do Additional
Crimes Affect Victim Reporting and Police Clearance of Rape?, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMI-
NOLOGY 205, 212, 215, 220 (2008); see also Scott M. Walfield, When a Cleared Rape Is Not
Cleared: A Multilevel Study of Arrest and Exceptional Clearance, 31 J. INTERPERSONAL VIO-
LENCE 1767, 1777 (2016). In England, one study found that 40.7% of kidnapping offenses
from 1979 to 2001 had an accompanying sexual or violence conviction, 32.9% had an accom-
panying acquisitive conviction (theft, burglary, robbery, etc), and 3.4% had another accompany-
ing conviction, totaling 77%. Keith Soothill et al., Kidnapping: A Criminal Profile of Persons
Convicted 1979–2001, 25 BEHAV. SCI. L. 69, 75 tbl.3 (2007).
351 See Tillyer et al., supra note 343, at 378; see also FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note
42, at 2–3 & fig.2.
352 See Brendan Lantz et al., Stereotypical Hate Crimes and Criminal Justice Processing:
A Multi-Dataset Comparison of Bias Crime Arrest Patterns by Offender and Victim Race, 36
JUST. Q. 16, 22–23 (2017); see also Steven Briggs & Tara Opsal, The Influence of Victim Eth-
nicity on Arrest in Violent Crimes, 25 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 177, 178, 182–85 (2012); Michele
Stacey et al., Victim and Suspect Race and the Police Clearance of Sexual Assault, 7 RACE JUST.
226, 230–31, 240 (2017); Terrance J. Taylor et al., Racial Bias in Case Processing: Does Victim
Race Affect Police Clearance of Violent Crime Incidents?, 26 JUST. Q. 562, 576 (2009).
353 See Stacey et al., supra note 352, at 226.
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have found prosecutors tend to charge more serious offenses, provide harsher plea
offers, and ask for more severe sentences for black and Hispanic defendants over
white ones.354
But because federal and state officials gather little to no information regarding
the perpetrator’s race, policy makers or researchers cannot reliably determine when
and where prosecutors enhance or choose to prosecute people for kidnapping.355
These data collection methods must be done to enable better research and resolution
of this issue.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
While kidnapping merger seemed like a good idea at the time, courts failed to
address the serious constitutional problems stemming from the historical reasons
that motivated legislatures to greatly expand kidnapping’s definition. The offense,
as written in most states, is unconstitutional, particularly because, as this Article has
demonstrated, it has racist underpinnings and was entirely reactionary.356 Given that
kidnapping merger tests have become hopelessly unworkable and impossible to
apply consistently, legislatures and courts must act to remedy the problem.
A. State Legislatures Must Redefine Kidnapping to Prevent Discriminatory
Enforcement
The best solution is simple: rewrite kidnapping statutes. Legislatures need to
take the responsibility to carefully redefine kidnapping such that it does not overlap
with other offenses, particularly to exclude minimal restraints or asportations that
would accompany other “host crimes” in order to prevent prosecutors from discrimi-
natorily manipulating the offense.357
354 See Besiki L. Kutateladze et al., Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic
Disparity in Prosecution and Sentencing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 514, 514–15 (2014); M. Marit
Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON.
1320, 1320 (2014) (“Across the distribution, blacks receive sentences that are almost 10 percent
longer than those of comparable whites arrested for the same crimes. Most of this disparity
can be explained by prosecutors’ initial charging decisions, particularly the filing of charges
carrying mandatory minimum sentences. Ceteris paribus, the odds of black arrestees facing
such a charge are 1.75 times higher than those of white arrestees.”); John Wooldredge et al.,
Is the Impact of Cumulative Disadvantage on Sentencing Greater for Black Defendants?, 14
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 187, 189 (2015).
355 FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note 42, at 2.
356 See id. at 9; Wooldredge et al., supra note 354, at 210 tbl.3.
357 Olsen, supra note 192, at 385; see also Napier, supra note 22, at 199 (stating that kid-
napping must maintain “a distinct and identifiable role in a criminal code, and not using it
as a backup provision to supplement other offences”).
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Kidnapping’s modern version has “little in common” with its common law pre-
decessor “except its name” and because of its “chequered history,” it falls to state
legislatures, who have the first responsibility to carefully spell out a “straightforward
and readily comprehensible” definition of kidnapping, especially one that can be
equally applied in a non-discriminatory manner.358 As one court put it, the distinction
between kidnapping and other offenses “must be clearly delineated to avoid cumula-
tive penalties.”359
The easiest way to accomplish this was done by the Model Penal Code’s
drafters, who decided to “effect a major restructuring of the law of kidnapping,”
because they recognized the problem as detailed in this Article: “many prior kidnap-
ping statutes combined severe sanctions with extraordinarily broad coverage, to the
effect that relatively trivial restraints carried sanctions of death or life imprison-
ment.”360
The Code Section 212.1 defines kidnapping much more narrowly, returning
closer to its common law form:
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes an-
other from his place of residence or business, or a substantial
distance from the vicinity where he is found, or if he unlawfully
confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation,
with any of the following purposes: (a) to hold for ransom or
reward, or as a shield or hostage; or (b) to facilitate commission
of any felony or flight thereafter; or (c) to inflict bodily injury on
or to terrorize the victim or another; or (d) to interfere with the
performance of any governmental or political function.361
The drafters specifically intended to “restrict the scope of kidnapping, as an
alternative or cumulative treatment of behavior whose chief significance is robbery
or rape, because the broad scope of this overlapping offense has given rise to serious
injustice.”362
This is a much better definition. It avoids the vagueness problem, virtually
eliminates a need for kidnapping merger tests, and moves to a definition far from the
racist and reactionary definitions of the past. As the Code’s drafters were well
358 Napier, supra note 22, at 200–01.
359 State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ¶ 19, 994 P.2d 1243, 1248.
360 MODEL PENAL CODE Pt. II, art. 212, explanatory note for sections 212.1–.5 (AM. LAW
INST.); Olsen, supra note 192, at 385.
361 MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1.
362 Id. cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 11, 1960). Indeed, one author has proposed
limiting kidnapping convictions to the common law forms, which are for ransom or hostage-
motivated takings or takings of a long period of time. Diamond, supra note 33, at 31–32.
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aware, “[e]xamples of abusive prosecution for kidnapping are common” and this
definition remedies that problem.363
I recognize, however, that legislatures have little incentive to make such a change.
Given that kidnapping cases arouse public sentiment, politicians have had little mo-
tivation to substantially narrow their kidnapping statutes. That leaves the remaining
remedies to the courts.
B. Courts Must Invalidate Kidnapping Statutes for Constitutional Violations
The United States and state constitutions constrain legislatures’ ability to vaguely
and overbroadly define kidnapping, through, most notably, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and Equal Protection Clause.364
1. Vagueness
I have shown how kidnapping, as defined, is not sufficiently unique to prevent
discriminatory enforcement.365 Given its questionable history, courts should invali-
date kidnapping statutes as unconstitutionally vague. As the Supreme Court has said,
a statute must define a criminal offense “sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”366 If the legislature does not do this, a
statute, like kidnapping here “allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue
their personal predilections.”367 “Legislatures,” the Court earlier affirmed, “may not
so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.”368
The Court did just that in Chatwin v. United States, refusing to give the federal kid-
napping statute its literal meaning, which it acknowledged was “comprehensive . . .
[w]ere we to sanction a careless concept of the crime of kidnapping or were we to
disregard the background and setting of the Act the boundaries of potential liability
would be lost in infinity.”369
As the Michigan Court of Appeals put it in 1971, its own statute prohibited an
“extraordinary range of conduct” such that it led to absurd results:
363 MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 cmt.1 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 11, 1960).
364 See generally John F. Stinneford, Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1955 (2015).
365 See FINKELHOR & OMROD, supra note 42, at 1.
366 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
367 Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
368 Smith, 415 U.S. at 575.
369 326 U.S. 455, 463–64 (1946).
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The trespasser who momentarily locks a caretaker in his cottage
is placed on the same footing as the professional criminal who
invades a home, seizes the occupants at gunpoint, transports them
to a secret hideout, and holds them for ransom. The robber who
orders his victim to stand motionless while his wallet is removed
is guilty of the same crime as the robber who forces his victim
to drive for miles to a deserted location, where he is terrorized
and abandoned. A group of college students who invade a dean’s
office, wrongfully confining its occupants, commit the same of-
fense as a gang of rapists who seize a woman and remove her
from her family to a place of isolation.370
The court commented its kidnapping statute provided “unlimited discretion” to
prosecutors, judges, and juries.371 The offense “is so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free
to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
each particular case.”372 And here, because kidnapping remains so broad, it improperly
“leave[s] room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.”373 And
a particular prosecutor’s motivations, even if non-discriminatory, do not solve the prob-
lem. “Well-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice
of a vague law.”374
As the Supreme Court put it over a century ago, courts cannot step aside in the
face of vague laws:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net
large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the
courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained,
and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent,
substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the gov-
ernment.375
Courts should void kidnapping statutes to remedy the vagueness violations.
370 People v. Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
205 N.W.2d 415 (Mich. 1973). Adams carefully walks through many of the points made in
this section.
371 Id. at 25.
372 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966).
373 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
374 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
375 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
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2. Double Jeopardy Clause
Kidnapping’s overbreadth also implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause, which
prohibits “multiple punishments for the same offense.”376 A common theme emerges
from double jeopardy jurisprudence: the government violates double jeopardy when
it attempts to “charge-stack” and punish defendants with multiple charges out of
what was essentially one common, continuous act.377
Since a defendant can receive a kidnapping conviction along with any offense that
involves a detention or asportation, he in essence receives multiple punishments for a
single criminal act.378 “The motivating principle behind the merger doctrine is to pre-
vent violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection,” is a common theme
among courts.379 “Merger and double jeopardy doctrines seek the same end: protect-
ing against punishing one criminal act twice.”380
A double jeopardy check is needed not only because kidnapping’s definition has
greatly expanded, but because of the explosion of new legislative offenses. At com-
mon law, crimes were a judicial creation, there were few of them, and their elements
were simple and non-overlapping.381 But today, even “small differences in the
statutorily defined elements” make many offenses overlap and subject defendants
376 Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 307 (1984); see Ehrenreich, supra
note 300, at 91.
377 Stinneford, supra note 364, at 1989–90.
378 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57 ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 615, 618 (“Merger is a judicially-
crafted doctrine available to protect criminal defendants from being twice punished for
committing a single act that may violate more than one criminal statute.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
379 Id.; see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (noting the Double Jeopardy Clause
“forbids . . . cumulative punishment”); State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 660 (Alaska Ct. App.
1994) (holding trial court did not err in merging kidnapping and murder conviction for implicat-
ing double jeopardy principles); State v. Reagan, No. M2002-01472-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL
1114588, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2004) (“Merger avoids a double jeopardy problem
while protecting the jury’s findings.”); State v. Bond, 2019 UT 88 ¶ 65, 361 P.3d 104, 122; State
v. Williams, 2007 UT 98 ¶¶ 6–7, 175 P.3d 1029, 1032; State v. Johnson, 600 P.2d 1249, 1253
(Wash. 1979), disapproved of by State v. Sweet, 980 P.2d 1223, 1229–30 (Wash. 1999) (arguing
that the court’s conclusion of merging kidnapping and rape conviction was “strengthened when
it is observed that constitutional double jeopardy provisions forbid double punishment”); State
v. Elmore, 228 P.3d 760, 768 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he nature of the restraint determines
whether the kidnapping will merge into a separate crime to avoid double jeopardy viola-
tions.”); Nolan, supra note 300, at 531 (“[T]he Colorado Supreme Court has indicated repeatedly
that judicial merger and statutory merger find their roots in double jeopardy principles.”).
380 People v. Henderson, 810 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo. 1991).
381 Poulin, supra note 300, at 1200 (citing Honorable Monroe G. McKay, Double Jeopardy:
Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 13–14 (1983); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262, 279 (1965)).
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to extraordinary amounts of punishment.382 Second, at common law, prosecutors
could not join felonies together—“multiple convictions and punishment could result
only from multiple trials.”383
In 1777, in the case of Crepps v. Durden, a baker was convicted of four counts
of violating a statute that prohibited a person from “exercising his ordinary trade on
the Lord’s day” for selling four loaves of bread on a Sunday.384 The court rejected
the claim that the baker committed four violations and reduced it to one, since pros-
ecutors could arbitrarily divide the violation time, say into a “day, hours, or min-
utes.”385 Lord Mansfield found it absurd that a tailor could be found guilty for “every
stitch” sewn on a Sunday, for example.386 The statute’s purpose was to punish one
particular act, not an arbitrary division of “repeated offenses.”387
Nearly a century later, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a punish-
ment as violating double jeopardy where the defendant was given both a fine of
$200 and jail time of one year where the statute required the court to give one or the
other.388 “If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America,” the
Court said, “it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence.”389
In Ex parte Snow, a few years later, the Court heard the claim of a Mormon
polygamist who was charged and convicted with violating a cohabitation statute for
three separate years: 1883, 1884, and 1885.390 The Court found the charges’ year dis-
tinction arbitrary: the offense was one continuous act.391 Of particular concern, the
Court focused on the fact that without a check, the government could pursue an
endless number of charges for the same act:
On the same principle there might have been an indictment
covering each of the 35 months, with imprisonment for 17 1/2
years and fines amounting to $10,500, or even an indictment
covering every week, with imprisonment for 74 years and fines
amounting to $44,400; and so on, ad infinitum, for smaller periods
of time.392
382 Id.
383 Id.; McKay, supra note 381, at 14–15; see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
384 (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1283 (K.B.); 2 Coup. 640, quoted in Ex parte Snow, 120
U.S. 274, 283–84 (1887).
385 Ex parte Snow, 120 U.S. at 284–85.
386 Id. at 284.
387 Id.
388 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 164, 168 (1873).
389 Id. at 168.
390 120 U.S. at 276–77.
391 Id. at 281–82.
392 Id. at 282.
2020] KIDNAPPING RECONSIDERED 681
Two years later, the Court again addressed the arbitrary division of time in a
Mormon polygamy prosecution and found, citing Snow, that trying to arbitrarily
divide time to punish a defendant for a continuing offense offended double jeopardy.393
Numerous other cases support the same principle: that the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy prohibits multiple charges and punishments for a continu-
ous offense.394
Thus, another principle emerges. Double jeopardy protects the defendant from
governmental action that takes what is essentially one crime and arbitrarily dividing
it into multiple crimes.
Kidnapping now implicates this provision.395 The legislatively authorized num-
ber of offenses in modern statutes are so numerous and so closely related that
prosecutors can engage in the same charge-stacking problem. They can discriminate
with impunity, using a law that from its inception has been defined and utilized
improperly and unfairly. Prosecutors now have at their disposal incredibly broad
criminal statutes to which they can simply tack on, whenever they arbitrarily choose,
a kidnapping charge.
Because kidnapping is no longer a separate and distinct common-law offense,
but occurs in virtually every crime in which some degree of involuntary detention
or movement will happen, such as a robbery, rape, sexual assault, or murder, it
becomes a wholly indistinct crime. And now prosecutors can take a host offense
with some detention and in every case, or more problematically, in only those they
choose, to enormously elevate the sentence and consequent punishment with a
separate kidnapping charge.396
Courts must step in. “If the legislature is free to define fragmented offenses,” as
they do around the nation with kidnapping offenses, “the defendant loses what may
be viewed as the central protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”397
Some critics and courts have observed that because double jeopardy violations
require overlapping elements—the “same offense” under the Supreme Court’s
393 Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 185–87 (1889).
394 See, e.g., Stinneford, supra note 364, at 2007–10; see also, e.g., United States v. New
York Guar. & Indem. Co., 27 F. Cas. 133, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1875) (breaking down a refusal to file
a tax return into ninty one-month increments) (No. 15,872); Mayor v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns.
122, 922–23, 125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (charging defendant with one count for each hundred
pounds of gunpowder); State v. Comm’rs of Fayetteville, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 371, 371–72
(1818) (charging defendants, who had a duty to keep streets in good repair, with one count for
each street, wondering why division couldn’t be for “every hundred yards, (why not every
yard?),” and observing that rendering crimes “infinitely divisible” was “repugnant to the spirit
and policy of the law and ought not to be countenanced”).
395 See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 795 P.2d 996, 1000 (N.M. 1990).
396 “Given the statutory definitions, it is possible that nearly every act of criminal sexual
penetration also will constitute the act of kidnapping.” Id.
397 Anne Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: Cutting the Gordian Knot,
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 609 (2006).
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Blockburger jurisprudence—kidnapping and some other offense will never violate
double jeopardy because they do not carry the same elements.398 However, this
reading of “same offense” is ultimately too narrow to adequately protect defendants
from the dangers of multiple prosecutions.
The clause says that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”399 Clearly, it prohibits duplicative charges for the
exact same offense, like the polygamists, but this reading prohibits stacking a kid-
napping charge on some offense for no additional or separate conduct. Instead, the
double jeopardy clauses should be read to mean that a person may not receive
multiple punishments for what is the same criminal action—the “same offence,” or
same factual predicate.400 Courts should be willing to strike down an overly broad
kidnapping statute because it enables a Double Jeopardy Clause violation.
3. Equal Protection
Kidnapping statutes also implicate equal protection, a concept deeply rooted in
racial equality.401 As the Supreme Court has said, “Concern . . . [for] equal protec-
tion was part of the fabric of our Constitution even before the Fourteenth Amend-
ment expressed it most directly in applying it to the States.”402 The clause means quite
simply that “[a] state may treat persons differently only when it is fair to do so” or “in
its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated.”403
The Equal Protection Clause had little utility before the 1960s and the Court
soon began to limit its power such that most “claims are dismissed out of hand.”404
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said that the clause was “last resort of constitutional
arguments.”405
398 Met v. State, 2016 UT 51 ¶¶ 932–33, 388 P.3d 447, 477 (Lee, J., concurring) (citing
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
399 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
400 See, e.g., Ex parte Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“For
Double Jeopardy purposes, the same offense means the identical criminal act, not the same
offense by name.” (alteration and quotation omitted)).
401 Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 753 (1985); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional
Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM.
HIST. 884, 884–85 (1987).
402 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94 n.1 (1979).
403 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1978); Jospeh Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949).
404 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–15 (1972); Sager, supra note
403, at 1216.
405 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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For a generation, the Supreme Court has diluted the Equal Protection Clause by
requiring one to complete the herculean task of showing purposeful discrimination
or some sort of conscious intent to discriminate, a nearly impossible task.406 But
while the Court has invalidated laws under the clause when a law had a discrimina-
tory impact, “the equal protection guarantee [has become] all but meaningless when
applied to criminal law enforcement,” such that minorities can now receive signifi-
cantly longer prison sentences when prosecutors exercise their discretion to add
kidnapping offenses to a host crime.407
The Court’s selective prosecution test requires a defendant to show a system that
has “a discriminatory effect” and that his prosecution was “motivated by a discrimi-
natory purpose.”408 Thus, to sustain an Equal Protection claim, a defendant would
need to show “clear evidence to the contrary”: the number of kidnappings commit-
ted in a jurisdiction, noting the particular fact patterns in each case.409 He would then
have to parse those crimes out by race of the perpetrator.410 Then, he would have to
show that, for similar conduct, “stark” data showing prosecutors declined to charge
white people with kidnapping but then charged black people with kidnapping.411
This “demanding” standard creates three impossible hurdles.412 First, almost no
jurisdiction keeps factual and race data on all crimes, charged or uncharged.413 For
example, the Seventh Circuit rejected a defendant’s claim that he was targeted for
a kidnapping charge and was entitled to government charging records, because he
provided “no evidence whatsoever that the defendant was singled out for prosecu-
tion because of his race.”414 But one has to wonder how the defendant would get the
406 E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977)
(rejecting black plaintiffs’ equal protection claim since they “simply failed to carry their burden
of proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village’s decision”);
see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 347 (1987); Robert J. Lotero, Note, The Village
of Arlington Heights: Equal Protection in the Suburban Zone, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 361,
373–74 (1977).
407 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6, 8 (2011); see
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 222 (1985) (invalidating Alabama Constitution’s disen-
franchisement provision for discriminatory intent in its passage and its discriminatory impact).
408 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 608 (1985); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 217–18 (1982); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 423–24 (1981); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479–80 (1954).
409 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
410 Id. at 465–66.
411 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293; see Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465–66; Hernandez, 347 U.S.
at 479–80.
412 See Love v. State, 468 N.E.2d 519, 521 (Ind. 1984); State v. Johnson, 600 P.2d 1249,
1252 (Wash. 1979); STUNTZ, supra note 407, at 214.
413 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463; STUNTZ, supra note 407, at 214.
414 United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th Cir. 1985).
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information to even support the claim without access to it to begin with, especially
if the jurisdiction does not keep these type of records.
Second, and more difficult, because kidnapping can be easily added to a robbery,
a rape, a sexual assault, or any number of crimes, the pool of offenses, and the underly-
ing factual predicates which would support a kidnapping charge, is virtually limitless.
Third, a defendant rarely, if ever, can show that a particular prosecutor had a
discriminatory motivation absent some sort of smoking gun, such as an email indi-
cating the prosecutor intended to charge a defendant because of his race.
In two Indiana cases, both white and black prisoners engaged in a prison
uprising.415 The prosecutor chose only to charge six black inmates with kidnapping,
two of whom raised equal protection arguments on appeal, since only “black[s] . . .
classified as ‘aggressive’ . . . were charged with kidnapping.”416 In one of the cases,
the court found that because the defendant was seen “watching over a guard,” a jury
could infer he intended to take guards hostage, which was enough to sustain his
kidnapping conviction.417 In both cases, the court summarily rejected the equal
protection arguments, observing the charging decision “was [entirely] that of the
prosecuting attorney.”418
This is the problem. White and black defendants commit the same offense. The
prosecutor charges only blacks. Defendants claim the prosecution was selective, but
because they do not have access to charging motivations, and particularly because
kidnapping is such an overly broad offense sustainable by almost any evidence in
any case, it is exactly the type of mask a prosecutor can hide behind to pursue a
private discriminatory motivation. And no defendant, absent an extraordinary dis-
covery, could ever prove otherwise.
Even though those who wrote the clause believed the law should apply equally
to all citizens regardless of race, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence allows
prosecutors to enforce kidnapping statutes excessively against minorities and its test
fails to hold governmental officials accountable to equally enforce the law since the
crime is defined in a race-neutral manner.419
This does not have to be the case. As the Court put it in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, if
administration of a law is used against a class of people, it denies equal protection:
415 Greene v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (Ind. 1987); Love, 468 N.E.2d at 521.
416 Greene, 515 N.E.2d at 1380; Love, 468 N.E.2d at 520.
417 Greene, 515 N.E.2d at 1379–80.
418 Id.; Love, 468 N.E.2d at 521; see State v. Horn, 610 P.2d 551, 555 (Idaho 1980) (finding
that the prosecutor declined to prosecute two other defendants for the same kidnapping, “[t]here
is no evidence that the prosecutor based his decision to prosecute them for kidnapping on
improper standards or motives”).
419 STUNTZ, supra note 407, at 119–21; see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 456
(1996) (finding that even though all crack cases prosecuted involved black defendants, defen-
dant’s claim failed because he could not point to white people who were not prosecuted);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 487 U.S. 279, 281 (1987) (finding no equal protection violation despite
fact that the death penalty was disproportionately used on black defendants).
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Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circum-
stances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution.420
As Ronald Dworkin has put it, we should not “use the Equal Protection Clause
to cheat ourselves of equality.”421 Kidnapping has its origins in a form of racism and
its disparate impact and the Equal Protection Clause, as Charles Lawrence has put
it, “must find a way to come to grips with unconscious racism” because without it,
“the Court [has] create[d] an imaginary world where discrimination does not exist
unless it was consciously intended.”422
Courts should give equal protection the teeth it deserves as it relates to kidnap-
ping. Courts should require governmental entities to collect the fact patterns on
charged and uncharged offenses so that defendants can utilize the evidence they
need support equal protection claims. Without judicial intervention, these violations
will continue to occur.
4. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
Because kidnapping statutes are overly broad, they violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.423 They allow an excessive punish-
ment for a single criminal act. To determine whether a punishment is cruel and un-
usual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”424
The principle has long backing in the common law.425 “Writers from Bracton to
Blackstone declared that punishment is unjustified unless it is based upon an of-
fender’s moral culpability.”426 Early courts frequently struck down fairly ordinary
cases as cruel and unusual, such as a Kentucky statute making it a crime for a black
person to strike a white person, even in self-defense, or a punishment of twelve
years in prison for a crime that involved no harm.427
420 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).
421 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 287 (2d ed. 1997).
422 Lawrence, supra note 406, at 323, 325.
423 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
424 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
425 Stinneford, supra note 364, at 1987.
426 Id.
427 Id.; see Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70, 70 (1820); see also Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381–82 (1910).
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Other courts have made similar observations. For example, “[U]nder the Eighth
Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes even of those who have
committed serious crimes.”428 Also, “The concept of proportionality is central to the
Eighth Amendment. Embodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishments is the ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to [the] offense.’”429 And courts must compare the “gravity of the
offense and the severity of the sentence.”430
Here, given the proliferation of statutes, prosecutors can stack related charges
such that persons receive life sentences for ordinary crimes.431 In essence, if prosecu-
tors can select from an arsenal of statutes with similar elements for one crime, and
can simply add a kidnapping charge to the mix they “will have the power to procure
virtually any prison sentence they wish simply by manipulating the number” of those
offenses.432 Courts should invalidate kidnapping statutes that enable this to occur.
5. Rule of Lenity
As a last-ditch option, courts should also use the rule of lenity to prevent pros-
ecutors from using kidnapping convictions to enhance sentences. Consider the
following judicial observations: “[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”433 “It may fairly be said to be a pre-
supposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against
the imposition of a harsher punishment.”434 “The rule of lenity requires that we
interpret an ambiguous statute in favor of lenity toward the person charged with
criminal wrongdoing.”435 “[I]n the absence of a clear indication that the legislature
intended multiple punishment for the unitary conduct, the court should apply the
rule of lenity to presume that the legislature did not intend multiple punishment.”436
428 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
429 Id. at 59 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367).
430 Id. at 60.
431 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (“[A] criminal sentence must be proportionate
to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.”); see also Deal v. United States,
508 U.S. 129, 131, 137 (1993) (stacking counts of gun charges). The Supreme Court has admit-
ted that “the precise contours” of its proportionality law “are unclear” “[g]iven the lack of
clarity of our precedents” and that “we have not established a clear or consistent path for
courts to follow.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72–73, 74 n.1 (2003).
432 Stinneford, supra note 364, at 1973.
433 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
434 Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
435 State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72 ¶ 22, 356 P.3d 1258, 1266.
436 State v. Landgraf, 913 P.2d 252, 261–62 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v.
Franklin, 865 P.2d 1209, 1213 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)).
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The rule of lenity serves three purposes here.437 It provides that if the legislature
ambiguously fails to delineate a clear offense, then the court must choose the most
lenient for a defendant: “a person’s behavior should not be criminalized unless the
legislature clearly and precisely proscribes the behavior in a criminal code.”438
Second, it would “prevent zealous prosecutors and timorous judges from perceiving
two offenses where the legislature intended only one.”439 Third, the rule would allow
for “greater predictability and coherence in results.”440
Thus, the rule operates to allow courts to exercise lenity in a given case to pre-
vent multiple punishments or excessive enforcement.441
CONCLUSION
Kidnapping has a troubled history in the law.442 It was instituted, perpetuated,
and expanded almost exclusively after publicized and sensationalized cases where
the children of wealthy whites were taken.443 In the same periods, courts and legisla-
tures largely ignored the cries of minorities, particularly slaves or free blacks, that
they too had been kidnapped.444 In the public hysteria over the relatively few kid-
nappings of white children, legislatures expanded the offense’s definition to the point
that it lost all meaning and became unconstitutionally vague. To remedy this problem,
courts created kidnapping merger tests.445 But these tests have had little consistency
or coherency, and troublingly, they have done little to solve the issues of discrimina-
tory enforcement that have plagued kidnapping since its inception. Legislatures
should reconsider kidnapping and narrow its definition in order to prevent the
arbitrary use of police or prosecutorial discretion. If legislatures refuse to act, then
courts should strike down their kidnapping statutes as vague and as violations of
double jeopardy and equal protection, as well as a cruel and unusual punishment.
437 Id. at 261 (quoting Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a Theory of Double
Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 118); Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky, Note, Counting Offenses,
58 DUKE L. J. 709, 741–42 (2009).
438 Chemerinsky, supra note 437, at 741 (“[W]hen choosing between ‘two readings of
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher
alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.
We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication’” (quoting United
States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952))).
439 Landgraf, 913 P.2d at 261 (quoting Westen & Drubel, supra note 437, at 118).
440 Chemerinksy, supra note 437, at 742.
441 Id. at 741–42; see Landgraf, 913 P.2d at 261 (quoting Westen & Drubel, supra note
437, at 118).
442 See Napier, supra note 22, at 200–01.
443 See POTTER, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
444 ROTHMAN, supra note 53, at 182–83.
445 See State v. Miles, 245 N.E.2d 688, 695 (N.Y. 1969).
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Percy Wilder lost his case.446 The Utah Supreme Court summarily rejected his
constitutional claims, rejected its common law merger test, and opted to leave a statu-
tory merger test in place.447 It refused to act. In an era of mass incarceration, where
minorities overpopulate and fill our prison system, when we continue to see, trou-
blingly, ongoing systemic racism in the criminal justice system, courts must not remain
silent.448 One must wonder how many people serve years for a kidnapping offense that
amounted to nothing other than a tack-on for another offense that person committed.
We should redefine kidnapping. We should eliminate prosecutors’ ability to
overcharge and stack this offense. The courts must put a stop to these constitutional
violations and require legislatures to redefine the offense. Unless it changes, people
like Mr. Wilder will continue to fill our penitentiaries.
446 State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17 ¶ 38, 420 P.3d 1064, 1072.
447 Id. at ¶ 25 n.7, ¶ 38.
448 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN
(2017); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM (1999); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); SABRINA JONES & MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE: A
GRAPHIC RETELLING (2013).
